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The Effect of Construal Level on  
Consumers’ Anticipated (Un)Ethical Behavior 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Despite the many lapses in ethical behavior that have attracted widespread 
attention in recent years, little is known about the cognitive processes that shape 
people’s (un)ethical behavior and expectations of when it will occur. This lack of 
understanding exists despite substantial research on this topic within marketing. One 
factor that has contributed to this state of affairs is that most of the relevant 
investigations have focused simply on the practical implications and applications of 
ethics in marketing. Limited attention has focused on theory-driven inquiry. 
This research offers an initial attempt to fill this void. I do so by drawing on a 
corpus of work concerning both psychological distance and construal level theory 
(Liberman and Trope 2008). Psychological distance refers to the gap that often exists 
in time, space, familiarity, or likelihood that separates an event or object from the 
direct and personally experienced reality of the here and now. Moreover, variations in 
psychological distance have been found to affect people’s construal level, which 
refers to the level of abstraction at which people think about and mentally represent 
an event in memory (Trope, Liberman and Wakslak 2007). Increases in an event’s 
psychological distance (e.g., an event will happen in the more distant future or to a 
person other than oneself) prompts individuals to think about an event in a more 
abstract, less detailed manner, while decreases in psychological distance (e.g., an 
event occurs right now or to the self) elicit thoughts about the event in a more 
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concrete or specific manner. Social distance, a variable that I examine and one that 
captures the familiarity dimension of psychological distance, would seem to be of 
importance in ethical situations for at least two reasons. First, ethical issues generally 
emerge in social contexts (i.e., ones involving people), making it likely that variation 
in social distance could be germane in ethical situations. Second, and more critically, 
because psychological distance regards the self in the here and now as its lowest 
endpoint or anchor, assessing one’s own (as opposed to any other person’s) behavior 
should stimulate an exceptionally concrete representation of the situation. 
Importantly, investigations into the effects produced by variations in 
psychological distance have demonstrated that adoption of a high construal level (i.e., 
thinking about an event more abstractly) prompts people to place greater priority on 
the desirability of pertinent end-states or goals. In contrast, adoption of a low 
construal level (i.e., thinking about an event more concretely) leads people to place 
higher priority on the feasibility and means used to achieve the end-state or goal. I 
found these observations about the effect of construal level on people’s priorities 
striking when applied to ethical contexts because in such contexts people aspire to 
achieve a desirable end-state or higher level goal by employing a means that is 
unethical. The theory that underlies my hypotheses integrates the preceding two 
notions, namely, (a) a high (low) construal level increases the relative importance 
assigned to desirability (feasibility) aspects of ethics-related situations, and (b) a 
focus on desirability aspects encourages unethical behavior by fostering a desire to 
attain end-states/goals irrespective of ethical considerations, yet a focus on 
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feasibility/means promotes more ethical behavior by heightening the salience of 
unethical actions. Combining the aforementioned premises and using extant 
knowledge of factors that influence psychological distance, I derived the following 
hypotheses. When individuals consider the behavior of an unknown (distal) person 
and thereby adopt a relatively high construal level, they should anticipate that this 
person will engage in unethical behavior when the event’s psychological distance is 
greater (i.e., because this further encourages reliance on a higher construal level). But 
when individuals consider the behavior of the self -- an individual that fosters 
adoption of an extremely low construal level -- they may anticipate that the self will 
largely eschew unethical behavior, irrespective of other less potent factors that alter 
construal level by varying the psychological distance of the event.  
 The first two experiments found support for this hypothesis in nine different 
ethical scenarios that varied construal level in a number of ways.  In both 
experiments, construal level was manipulated by altering the focal actor (i.e., social 
distance: the self or an unknown other). In experiment 1, it was also manipulated 
through the temporal distance (i.e., close vs. far distance) of the event; in experiment 
2 changes in temporal distance were replaced by a fluency manipulation that varied a 
novel dimension of psychological distance (see Alter and Oppenheimer 2008). In 
both experiments a significant two-way interaction revealed that for an unknown 
other, a higher construal level (i.e., more temporal distance or reduced reading 
fluency) increased the expectation of unethical behavior, but expectations that the self 
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would behave unethically were low regardless of variation in the event’s temporal 
distance or fluency.  
 Importantly, a number of measures were included in the first two studies that 
addressed a potential rival explanation for my findings. Specifically, participants who 
were asked to anticipate their own behavior may have reported that they would 
behave quite ethically not because the self invoked a very low construal level as I 
predicted, but instead because consideration of the self stimulated their desire to 
present themselves favorably either to themselves or other people. In other words, self 
presentation concerns might have produced the outcomes that were observed in the 
self as actor condition. I investigated such possible self presentation concerns in 
assorted ways. However, analyses of these self presentation variables failed to reduce 
the significance of the interaction of the two instantiations of construal level (i.e., 
social distance and either temporal or metacognitive distance) that I observed in my 
studies. Thus, there was little support for the view that my findings could be 
explained by self presentation concerns. 
 Experiment 3 sought evidence of the mechanisms that underlie the preceding 
effects.  Consistent with my theorizing, analyses of mediated moderation and 
mediation found that together, desirability and feasibility related thoughts accounted 
for the effects of the social distance and construal level on participants’ expectations 
of unethical behavior. In particular, while variation in construal level significantly 
influenced the number of desirability related thoughts that participants produced 
when they considered the behavior that an unknown other person would enact, this 
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relationship was absent when participants anticipated how they themselves would 
behave. However, when participants considered how they themselves would behave, 
feasibility related thoughts were significantly elevated, especially when individuals 
relied on a low construal level. This increase in feasibility related thoughts mitigated 
the influence of desirability related thoughts. As a result, the heightened feasibility 
related thoughts prompted participants to anticipate that, irrespective of their 
construal level, they would behave ethically in response to the dilemma. 
 The final two experiments addressed an important issue by extending my 
research into an investigation of real (i.e., not hypothetical) behavior. Specifically, 
these final two studies established that a key factor that distinguishes between 
hypothetical situations (like those used in my initial three studies) and real ones (like 
those employed in studies 4 and 5) is whether individuals explicitly envision and 
attend to themselves as the actor, or instead their thoughts about the self as actor fade 
into the periphery as other more pressing considerations command more attention 
(i.e., considerations such as comprehension of the task, the stimuli that are present, 
their goals, etc.). When the self is highly salient and thus people direct explicit 
attention to oneself (i.e., an individual considers a hypothetical scenario with the self 
as the actor, or the salience of the self is otherwise heightened as in study 5), 
psychological distance is greatly diminished, and thoughts about feasibility related 
matters magnify substantially. In situations of this sort, variation in construal level is 
apt to be overpowered, rendering it too weak to exert an appreciable influence; 
instead individuals are likely to dwell on feasibility considerations, which motivate 
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them to behave quite honestly. In contrast, when attentiveness to the self is low, the 
imbalance just described should be absent. Hence, in situations of this type, the 
impact of construal level is likely to be felt. Indeed, study 5 bore out the preceding 
logic, revealing that variation in construal level predictably affected how honorably 
individuals behaved when the salience of the self was low, but it had no effect when 
salience of the self was high.  
Together, the results from all five studies I report provide converging support 
for the effects of construal level on ethical behavior. In addition, they shed light on 
the mediating roles that the desirability and feasibility of events play in producing this 
effect. 
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Chapter One 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
The last few decades have spawned a great deal of attention to the issue of 
business ethics. At least in part, this interest has been generated by a myriad of events 
that have led to the greatest economic recession in history.  Recent corporate 
transgressions such as the Enron scandal, the subprime mortgage crises, and the 
fallout from the BP oil spill have highlighted the dire consequences that unethical 
decisions and behaviors can have on the economy as a whole as well as on individual 
citizens.  Importantly,  corporate transgressions such as these and others are the result 
of the actions of individuals or groups of individuals -- people who may be inclined to 
place greater priority on desirable broader goals or end-states (e.g., increasing profits) 
than on the feasible yet ethically questionable means often used to achieve such goals.  
In 2003, a survey found that approximately 25% of U.S. adults approved of 
overstating the value of claims to insurance companies, and more than 10% condoned 
submitting claims for items that were not lost or damaged or services that were not 
provided (Accenture 2006).  In a similar spirit, a study by Von Lohmann (2004) 
revealed that 88% of children between the ages of 8 and 18 understood that peer-to-
peer music downloading was illegal, yet 56% of these children admitted to engaging 
in this practice. Despite the prevalence and wide-spread consequences of these and 
2 
 
other unethical decisions and actions, little is known about the factors that impact 
ethical decision-making at the individual level. 
This gap in our knowledge has prompted a recent increase in academic 
research on this topic (e.g., Argo and Shiv 2012; Zhong, Bohns and Gino 2010; 
Mazar, Amir and Ariely 2008).  Although this increased attention to ethics has 
touched many business-related disciplines, it appears that within the various business 
school disciplines, the majority of research on this topic has occurred in marketing.  
This may be due to several factors. For example, marketing is the field most closely 
related to actions that entail interacting with and influencing consumers, and these 
practices can invite many ethical dilemmas. Further, marketing managers encounter 
some of the most troublesome ethical quagmires in business (Mazar, et al., 2008). 
Indeed, Baumhart (1968), who surveyed executives across functional areas, found 
that five of the eight most important ethical problems that were cited concerned 
marketing activities.   
 
1.2 ETHICS AND MORALITY 
What is ethics? A review of various fields in the literature (e.g., marketing, 
psychology, philosophy) reveals no clear definition of ethics. Although philosophers 
have posited three main paradigms that seek to explain what makes a behavior 
(un)ethical (i.e., deontology, teleology or consequentialism, and virtue ethics) there is 
little agreement about how ethics or morality should be defined. The term “ethics” is 
typically used to refer to a set of rules, principles, or ways of thinking that guide or 
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are used to justify actions.  Yet, in most articles on this topic, a definition at best is 
only implicitly suggested through a discussion of moral philosophies or through the 
researchers’ choice of survey questions or experimental stimuli.   Further, a nagging 
problem that remains is that what is deemed ethical by one person may not be so by 
another.  A related issue that similarly is unclear concerns the distinction between 
ethics and morality.  The two terms are frequently used interchangeably.  
Nevertheless, there appears to be the sense that morality suggests a stern set of duties 
that require people to subordinate their natural desires so as to obey “moral law.”  
And failure to fulfill such duty often brings with it a heavy sense of guilt. For 
example, one is more likely to say that it is immoral to kill a helpless animal, but it is 
unethical to tell a lie.  Morality also is often assumed to have a religious basis. The 
connotations of morality generally reflect particular conceptions of ethics that are 
linked to Jewish and Christian traditions as opposed to any clearly articulated ethical 
system.  In contrast, ethics lacks such a connection with a particular religion or with 
religion in general (Singer 1994).  
A review of the marketing and psychology literature demonstrates that 
researchers in both fields refrain from taking any philosophical position in their 
studies.  For example, although Piaget (1932) and Kohlberg’s (1958, 1969) models of 
moral development are founded on a deontological approach, this foundation is 
merely implied.  Recent research in both marketing and psychology continues to 
avoid taking any philosophical position (e.g., Haidt 2001; Mazar and Aggarwal 2011, 
Argo et al., 2012).  Thus, in the present research, I simply view ethical dilemmas as 
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ones that are likely to be judged by most individuals as more or less acceptable 
depending on the circumstances of the situation. 
 
1.3 ETHICS IN MARKETING 
A substantial body of work that is related to ethics has emerged within 
marketing. Indeed, Murphy and Laczniak (1981) listed nearly 100 articles dealing 
with this subject.  More recently, Nill and Schibrowsky (2007) presented a review of 
the literature in this area and found that in the 20 years that followed the Murphy and 
Laczniak review, there were over 400 articles dealing with ethics in marketing. The 
next two subsections briefly overview some of this work. 
Most of the investigations on this topic have focused on the practical 
implications and applications of ethics in marketing. As such, they generally have 
been devoid of any theory-driven inquiry.  For the most part, emphasis has centered 
on three broad foci.  The first involves non-empirical work that endeavors to provide 
descriptive models of ethical decision-making for marketing practitioners (e.g., 
Ferrell and Gresham 1985) or work that  underscores the relevance of individual 
ideologies to marketing decisions and actions (e.g., Forsyth and Pope 1984). In 
addition, two other streams of research have investigated pertinent influencers of 
ethical behavior: situational or environmental factors (e.g., Ford and Richardson 
1994; Murphy, Smith and Daley 1992) and the role played by individual differences 
(e.g., Hegarty and Sims 1978; Mazar et al., 2011). In the next two sections, I briefly 
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review the latter two bodies of work, which have generally relied on survey data and 
correlational analyses.  
 
Situational or Environmental Factors 
Two situational factors that have been studied in the ethics literature are 
reward and punishment (Hegarty et al., 1978) and organizational size (Ford et al., 
1994).  Along these lines, by measuring the number of kickbacks that participants 
agreed to accept, Hegarty et al., (1978) found that people behaved less ethically under 
conditions of extrinsic reward, but they behaved more ethically under the threat of 
punishment.  Somewhat related work by Mazar et al., (2008) showed that increasing 
the accessibility of rules or standards before individuals confronted an ethical 
dilemma (i.e., recalling the Ten Commandments) elevated individuals’ ethical 
behavior. 
The influence of organizational size also has been investigated. Murphy et al., 
(1992) found that with the exception of individuals’ attitudes, company size exhibited 
the most significant correlation with ethical behavior.  In this work, the researchers 
found that six of the nine significant coefficients that were observed concerned 
marketing issues. Findings suggest that smaller rather than larger firms tended to 
demonstrate more ethical behavior.  In fact, in a review of the empirical literature on 
ethics, Ford et al., (1994) noted a consistent relationship between organization size 
and stage of moral reasoning. As the size of an organization increases, individuals’ 
ethical beliefs, decision making, and behaviors decrease. In a somewhat related vein, 
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research has shown that a person’s position in an organization’s hierarchy affects 
their perceptions of ethical behavior. A lower versus higher hierarchical position 
renders people more cognizant of ethical problems within the firm (Chonko and Hunt 
1985; Delaney and Sockell 1992). 
 
Individual Difference Factors 
Much attention in the marketing literature has been paid to individual 
differences that impact ethical decision making and behavior.  A number of studies 
found that compared to females, males are more likely to act unethically (Betz, 
O’Connell, and Shepherd 1989).  Also, using both correlational and experimental 
methods, Mazar et al., (2011) observed that collectivists versus individualists are 
more prone to offer bribes. These authors further found that this effect was mediated 
by individuals’ sense of responsibility for their actions. Individuals in collectivistic 
versus individualist cultures tend to hold more favorable attitudes toward sharing of 
responsibilities (Hui 1988), see others as providing a ‘cushion’ for their risky actions 
(Hsee and Weber 1999) and possess a weaker sense that they themselves determine 
who they are (Triandis 2001). 
Other research has revealed additional individual difference factors that can 
influence ethical decision making and behavior.  Along these lines, locus of control, 
economic and political value orientation, and Machiavellianism have all been 
identified as covariates that can affect unethical behavior (Hegarty et al., 1978). Some 
work by Hing, Bobocel, Zanna and McBride (2007) found that social dominance 
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orientation (SDO) and right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) exert important effects on 
such behavior.  Specifically, leaders high versus low in SDO who were partnered 
with agreeable followers made decisions that were more unethical. Further, followers 
who were high rather than low in RWA were more acquiescent to and supportive of 
an unethical leader. 
Based on the preceding bodies of work, some notable insights have been made 
in understanding practical factors that can influence ethical behavior. Nevertheless, 
what is missing is research that is rich and theoretically grounded that can shed more 
far-reaching light on this topic. In part, the dearth of such work may stem from the 
nature of the topic.  Ethics holds clear and important implications for the day to day 
activities of marketers.  As a result, ethics related inquiry in business and marketing 
has focused on applications (e.g., Smith, Cooper-Martin 1997) such as those that 
involve sales force management and behavior (e.g., Bellizzi and Hite 1989; McClaren 
2000)  or researchers’ responsibilities to respondents (Tybout and Zaltman 1974). The 
upshot is that, as Randall and Gibson (1990) noted, “there is surprisingly limited 
effort directed toward theory testing” in the ethics literature. 
The present research represents an initial attempt to fill this gap.  I do so by 
drawing on a corpus of work in the areas of construal level theory and psychological 
distance (Liberman and Trope 2008), which I review in some detail at the beginning 
of the third chapter. But first, I shall begin by providing a more comprehensive 
overview of research that has been conducted on the topics of ethics and morality in 
chapter 2. 
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Chapter Two 
REVIEW OF LITERATURES 
 
2.1 OVERVIEW OF CLASSICAL LITERATURES 
“Abstract, concrete, and in between, the questions about 
ethics abound.  What constitutes moral progress?  What 
criteria should we use to evaluate conduct? Can I 
morally justify my actions? Should I do the so-called 
right thing if it is against my self-interest?  What is the 
right thing anyhow?  … What is ethics?” – Gordon 
Marino, Ethics: The Essential Writings, 2010 
 
The preceding questions posed by Gordon Marino in his recently published 
anthology of ethics and morality have been pondered by some of the greatest minds 
for thousands of years.  Despite this, there remains very little agreement about the 
answers to any of these questions.  Indeed, while this chapter reviews academic 
literature from the fields of philosophy, psychology, and marketing, it will become 
apparent that any consensus on these issues is as elusive today as it ever was.  
Only one issue has been constant over the past several thousand years of 
writing on the issue of morality and ethics – the existence of three paradigms: 
deontology, teleology (often referred to as consequentialism), and virtue ethics.  
Although each of these will be explained in more detail in the coming pages, it is 
useful to briefly outline the three paradigms at this stage so as to better understand the 
philosophical positions of both the original thinkers on morality and ethics and the 
more current research that is underway in the areas reviewed later in this chapter, 
namely psychology, business, and marketing. 
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The first two philosophies, deontology and consequentialism, are action 
based.  They focus entirely on the actions that a person performs.  Specifically, 
deontological philosophies are based on the belief that the consequences of one’s 
action are outside of the actor’s control; therefore, they are irrelevant to moral 
judgment.  A deontological philosophical approach is rules-based, and as a result, it 
relies heavily on the actor’s motive and free-will in determining the morality of the 
action (e.g., did the actor intend to lie).  In contrast, consequentialism, which is a 
teleological or ends-focused philosophy, emphasizes the final outcome of an act.  As 
a result, moral judgments are based on the consequences of an action. An important 
distinction between these two philosophical positions (i.e., consequentialism and 
deontology) involves the weight that is given to internal and external factors in 
determining morality of actions.  Deontologists place greater weight on the actor’s 
internal motivation to follow the rules that distinguish right from wrong.  For 
consequentialists, however, judging morality is based more on the direct and 
peripheral results of an action. Finally, a third philosophy, virtue ethics, places less 
emphasis on the rules that individuals follow or on the consequences of their actions. 
Instead it focuses on an individual’s character – an actor’s traits, such as his or her 
honesty and kindness.  
To illustrate the differences among these three paradigms, take the example of 
a child who takes and throws another child’s toy.  A deontological perspective would 
judge the morality of the child’s action based only on the fact that the toy was thrown: 
Throwing the toy was bad (lacking in morality) because one should not take another 
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person’s things without permission and one should not throw things.  In contrast, a 
consequentialist’s perspective would judge the morality of the child’s action 
differently depending on the consequences of the action.  If the other child cries or a 
bystander is injured, then judgment of the act will be harsher; yet, if the other child 
reacts with indifference and/or if no one else is injured by the thrown toy, then the 
action may not be judged as immoral at all.  Finally, if a virtue ethicist was to assess 
the action, judgments would be based on the perceived underlying motivation of the 
actor – was the act playful or malicious?  The accuracy of such a judgment would 
depend on the knowledge of the actor’s past behavior and other illustrations of his or 
her character.  
Much of the research that has been conducted in psychology and marketing 
over the last century is based on these three types of moral philosophies.  As such, 
possessing a more enriched account that captures the progressive development of 
these moral positions is useful for understanding the current literature in ethics and 
morality.  Therefore this review will begin by providing such an account of these 
fundamental moral philosophies.  Also, when appropriate, the relevance of these 
philosophies to present-day research in psychology and marketing will be illustrated 
by providing examples of their role in current research. 
 
Three Key Paradigms: Deontology, Consequentialism (Teleology), and Virtue-
Ethics 
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As is the case with a number of aspects of Western thought (e.g., law and 
politics), a discussion of moral philosophy should begin with Socrates, who based 
much of his thinking in all areas of philosophy on the primacy of rationality and 
intelligence.  Socrates based a great deal of his view of morality on the belief that 
people need direction in an unstable and unpredictable world and that this direction 
should come from within – from the self.  As a result, he equated morality with 
intelligence and believed that by gaining intelligence a person could live a more 
moral life.  Socrates believed so strongly in this proposition that he suggested that this 
goal was to be sought above even one’s own happiness.   
Plato, Socrates’ student, moderated this position by suggesting that morality 
did not need to come at the expense of happiness because intelligence and goodness 
go hand in hand.  As a result, a more moral life would itself foster a happier life.  In 
his view, wrong decisions were the result of ignorance, and for this reason, the 
development of the mind would lead to a happier and more moral individual. 
Like both Socrates and Plato, Aristotle, who was a student of Plato, also 
emphasized the importance of intelligence for determining the best course of conduct 
in life.  However, Aristotle offered a significantly different view of morality, which is 
still popular today (Beauchamp, Bowie and Arnold 2008).  He introduced the 
paradigm of virtue-ethics.  Virtue-ethics does not focus on the consequences of an 
action or even its function as a duty. Rather it emphasizes the stable character of the 
actor.  While Aristotle believed that there are two types of virtue –intellectual and 
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moral– he emphasized the importance of moderation in order to attain such virtue.  
This was explicated through his famous doctrine of “the golden mean.” 
The golden mean emphasized that any quality will constitute a virtue when it 
is present in the right amount.  Even a trait like honesty will be a vice if it is present 
in either a minimal or an excessive amount. Importantly, given his dependence on 
rationality, Aristotle believed that the right amount must always be determined by 
reason rather than by feelings, and it must be calculated with reference to the proper 
development of the personality as a whole.  This view plays an important role in 
several current philosophies in psychological research because it leads to the 
introduction of social norms in the realm of morality.  For example, when a friend 
asks how he or she looks in a garment, the ethical response is not always the most 
honest response.  The ethical response to that question depends on factors such as the 
cultural norms of the situation, the relationship of the two individuals involved in the 
interaction, and the respondent’s perceptions of the reason that such a question was 
asked.  Virtue-ethicists believe that the right or ethical thing to do is highly contingent 
on the person’s ability to intelligently assess and integrate all of these issues while 
also being of the right moral character (i.e., having the right amount of honesty, 
empathy, etc.) and then to act on this in an appropriate manner. 
Whereas Socrates and Plato were deontologists and Aristotle was a virtue-
ethicist, a handful of British philosophers and political activists crystallized the 
paradigm of consequentialism in the 18
th
 century.   Largely as a result of the 
economic and political changes that were occurring during this period, the theory of 
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utilitarianism was formed – a theory based strictly on the philosophy of 
consequentialism.  Although this theory was first articulated by Jeremy Bentham, a 
political radical and philosopher of law, it has become most closely associated with 
British economist and philosopher, John Stuart Mill.  At the heart of this philosophy 
is the belief that one should always proceed in accordance with whatever action will 
promote the greatest good for the greatest number of people.  In current psychological 
and marketing literature, the work of John Stuart Mill is one of the two most often 
cited and relied upon; the other is the work of Immanuel Kant, which will be 
discussed shortly. 
Essentially, Mill believed that any moral problem should be addressed by 
asking the question, “What will make everyone happiest?”  It is clear that this 
philosophy was influenced by Plato and Aristotle’s teachings about the relationship 
between morality and happiness. However, the focus in utilitarianism is not only on 
the happiness of the actor or decision-maker but that of all the parties who are directly 
or indirectly affected.  This is important because the manner in which Mill diverged 
most significantly from his predecessors concerned his view of happiness.  Like 
Bentham, Mill believed that the aim of ethics was happiness and that happiness 
equaled pleasure; it was from this belief that the implied relationship between doing 
good and increasing happiness was borne.  Where the two philosophers differed, 
however, was the definition of happiness.  For Bentham, all pleasures were of equal 
importance.  Mill, however, distinguished between the lower pleasures of the body 
(i.e., those of senses) and the higher pleasures, namely those that engage our minds.   
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He believed that people who have experienced both tend to prefer the higher 
pleasures and that the simple lower pleasures tend to be preferred by people who have 
no experience with deeper, more cognitively elevated indulgences, such as high art, 
and are therefore not in a proper position to judge. 
Although utilitarianism is often implicated in the current research on morality 
and ethics in the psychology and marketing literatures, the definitions that are used 
have changed considerably and have become more malleable as a result of 
researchers’ interpretations of the concept utility.  For example, in a recent review of 
the literature in psychology on moral judgment, Kalis (2010) noted that although 
different researchers have agreed that utilitarianism regards acts as morally right if 
they maximize utility (e.g., Brandt 1979; Singer 1993), this still necessitates 
agreement on what constitutes utility.  As Kalis notes, “Is it pleasure, happiness, 
welfare, or something else? Different versions of utilitarianism constitute different 
answers to this question.” (Kalis 2010, p. 101).  In the marketing literature, Chonko 
and Hunt (1985) go so far as to suggest that because full satisfaction of the 
expectations of all parties would constitute the most ethical behavior, an optimally 
ethical decision is impossible because “expectations are often contradictory and 
sometimes exceed social sanction”  (Chonko et al., 1985, p. 340). 
 
Kantian Ethics: The Importance of Principles and Free Will 
As noted earlier, in marketing and psychology, most of the research over the 
last century has relied on the work of two philosophers, John Stuart Mill and 
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Immanuel Kant.  I now turn to the moral philosophy of Kant, the most influential 
deontologist, whose philosophy is referred to as “Kantianism.” 
Like Plato, a fellow idealist, Kant believed that the outside world was 
secondary to mental activity, and this idealism played an important role in his moral 
philosophy. My review of the literature in psychology and marketing shows that 
Kantian moral philosophy is mentioned most often; it was an important influence of 
the seminal and highly influential work of developmental psychologists such as Jean 
Piaget and Lawrence Kohlberg.   
Kantian deontological philosophy differs significantly from utilitarianism in a 
number of respects.  What is significant about utilitarianism is that it derives its moral 
principle from a value that is in itself not moral, namely the neutral value of utility.  
On the other hand, deontological theories all claim that their justifying principles are 
based on values that are themselves moral values. 
Kant, the most influential deontologist, argued that morality cannot involve 
any tendencies of the actor.  That is, an act cannot be judged as moral if the actor 
wanted to perform the act.  Kant went so far as to suggest that an action is not moral 
unless it is done “from duty” rather than “in accord” with duty.  An important aspect 
of Kant’s philosophy is that it strongly implicates the role of free will – a point that 
has recently been addressed in the literature in psychology.  For example, in a study 
of the manner in which people judge the ethical behavior of others, Pizarro, Uhlmann 
and Salovey (2003) found that judgments of moral blame and praise of actors 
depicted in various vignettes varied depending on whether or not the actions were 
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described as having been enacted deliberately or impulsively.  Specifically, those in 
the study discounted the negativity of bad moral acts when they were a result of 
impulsive actions because it was assumed that the actors weren’t behaving of their 
own free will.  In another study, Vohs and Schooler (2008) investigated the impact of 
free will on actual ethical behavior.  These authors found that people who read 
statements that suggested a deterministic worldview cheated by rewarding themselves 
with cash payments significantly more than those who were exposed to messages 
about free will or even neutral messages. 
The role of free will makes temptation an important component of Kantian 
morality.  Kant suggests that in the grips of temptation, a person should rely on a rule 
that was formed during a previous similar experience.  If no such rule exists, then a 
person should take the proposed course of action and formulate it as a maxim or rule.  
Kant proposes that this rule will be tested by asking if one would vote for this rule if 
it were being written as legislation for all of mankind.   
Arguably, the most important aspect of Kantian moral philosophy is the 
position that humanity holds.  Kant argues that because human beings possess a moral 
dignity, they should not be treated as a means to an end as one might treat machinery 
or capital (Beauchamp et al., 2008).  He contends that using another human being as a 
means to an end or, more generally, treating a person as though (s)he is not an 
independent agent, fails to respect the moral position of humanity.  Beauchamp et al., 
illustrate this with an example in advertising: “Manipulative advertising that attempts 
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to make sales by interfering with the potential buyer’s reflective choice violates the 
principle of respect for persons” (2008, p. 24).   
 
Hume: The Importance of Emotions 
Any review of the literature in morality and ethics, particularly with respect to 
psychology and marketing, should also address the influence of David Hume, an 18
th
 
century philosopher and economist.  Recently, there has been a great deal of focus on 
automaticity in general in the fields of psychology and marketing (Bargh and 
Chartrand 1999; Dijksterhuis et. al. 2006; Tordesillas and Chaiken 1999).  As a result, 
there has been renewed interest in the work of David Hume, whose work drew 
attention to elements (e.g., feelings, heuristics) that often seem to occur automatically.  
Although Hume was the first to introduce the importance of utility to the philosophy 
of morality and it has also been suggested that he influenced Charles Darwin in his 
theory of evolution (Huntley, 1972), his work has received relatively little attention 
until recently.  This is due in large part to the significant departure of Hume’s 
philosophies from the more traditional theories of Aristotle, Mill, and Kant, 
particularly with respect to their positions on the role of cognitions. 
Hume’s greatest divergence from the previous philosophies of morality and 
ethics was with respect to the paramount importance he placed on the role of emotion 
in morality.  Unlike Kant, who once remarked that Hume had awakened him from his 
dogmatic slumbers (Marino 2010, p. 151), Hume believed that “reason is, and ought 
only to be, the slave of the passions and can never pretend to any other office than to 
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serve and obey them.” (Hume 1739, p. 462).  This viewpoint differed greatly from the 
Greek philosophers who emphasized the role of intelligence and rational deliberation 
in morality.  Specifically, Hume believed that reason can tell us what an appropriate 
means toward a certain end is, but that it cannot tell us whether a particular end is 
good or bad; only feeling or sentiment had the power to do that.   
Hume agreed with some of the utilitarian doctrine with respect to the role of 
the happiness of all members of a society as a measure of moral behavior, but he did 
not agree that it is the only thing that is good. His position is that human beings are 
complex organisms, and their total welfare includes more than the satisfaction of the 
one need for happiness. 
In general, however, the greatest impact that Hume has had on the recent work 
in psychology has been in research that relies on evolutionary theory and affect-based 
heuristic moral behavior. Hume viewed moral judgments as being based largely on 
feelings rather than cognition, because an awareness of facts alone is powerless to 
cause a person to act.  His work relied on the position that people act as a result of 
their feelings and desires.  Because all moral behaviors are manifested in some overt 
act, whether it is physical or verbal, emotion is a vital requirement.  Although Hume’s 
work preceded Darwin’s, Hume also viewed mankind as a creature of desire.  Hume’s 
moral philosophy depended largely on the assumption that people act according to 
their desires.  As a result, he concluded that when intellect (i.e., reason) and emotion 
do not concur, reason gives way to desire. 
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2.2 REVIEW OF LITERATURE IN PSYCHOLOGY 
Like philosophers, researchers in psychology make no clear distinction 
between that which is moral and that which is ethical. Nevertheless, the preceding 
review of alternative moral philosophies highlights why it is difficult to attain 
consensus on what is moral or ethical.  Depending on whether an individual 
approaches an ethical dilemma as a deontologist (e.g., Kant), a consequentialist (e.g., 
Bentham), or a virtue-ethicist, judgments of morality will vary significantly.  Beyond 
these philosophical principles, recent literature also has underscored the importance 
of a more heuristic and affect-based Humean judgment of moral transgressions, 
which needs to be incorporated. 
For the most part, philosophers and psychologists adopt very different foci in 
their inquiry into moral judgment.   Philosophers strive to define morality and identify 
the criteria that should be used to determine whether a person’s judgments or actions 
are moral.  In contrast, psychologists as well as marketers rarely endorse any single 
philosophical position concerning this matter, offer no clear definition of what is 
moral or ethical, and largely skirt this entire issue. Instead, their interest lies in 
understanding the development of moral judgment and shedding light on the 
psychological processes that prompt people to render judgments or behave in a 
manner that is assumed to signify appropriate moral or ethical conduct.  
The findings that have been generated in psychology and marketing shed light 
on why identifying a well-defined definition of morality and ethics remains elusive .  
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For example, in an investigation into the role of mindfulness
1
 on ethical decision 
making, Ruedy and Schweitzer (2011) uncovered a malleable individual difference 
that impacts the moral philosophy that one uses.  These authors measured 
participants’ reliance on deontological (principled) and consequentialist (teleological) 
approaches to ethical judgments and found that people who scored higher on 
mindfulness relied more on deontological judgments and they also cheated less.  
Importantly, mindfulness can be manipulated and people can increase mindfulness 
through meditational practice (Baer 2003), suggesting that a person’s reliance on a 
deontological or consequential philosophy is not fixed.  Other studies provide further 
evidence against the mutual exclusivity of deontological- and consequential-based 
thinking. Lammers and Stapel (2009) investigated the impact of power on the type of 
moral thinking in which people engage.  They found that the determination of the 
ethics of an act was based on how powerful a person was.  By manipulating power in 
a lab, the researchers found that people in higher positions of power relied more on 
deontological, rule-based thinking, while those in lower positions of power relied 
more on outcome-based (consequentialist) thinking. Such research suggests that the 
uses of deontological and consequential moral thinking are not mutually exclusive; 
rather these approaches to moral thinking are highly malleable.   
Together, these two sets of studies illustrate some of the messiness that is 
inherent in adopting a single philosophical position about moral judgment.  Such 
                                                 
1
 Mindfulness refers to an individual’s awareness of both internal (awareness of their own 
thoughts) and external (awareness of what is happening in their environment) factors. 
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work also sheds some light on why psychologists, marketing researchers, and 
business academicians frequently avoid taking any philosophical position at all.  In 
the next section I turn to the work of Piaget and Kohlberg, two of the most influential 
20th century psychological researchers who have studied morality and ethics.  After 
discussing the work by Kohlberg and others who investigated cognitive moral 
development, a brief review of a relatively new area in the literature will be provided, 
one that concerns cultural psychology. This body of work provides some evidence 
that what is considered moral may not be as universal as most early philosophers 
assumed.  Finally, my review of the research in psychology will end with a discussion 
of a very recent and exciting look at moral judgment that is closely associated with 
the work of Hume.  This nascent area draws heavily on work in evolutionary 
psychology and is concerned with the impact of affect and automatic processes on 
moral judgment.  
 
Review of the Cognitive Moral Development Literature 
In psychology, the chief investigators of the study of cognitive moral 
development are Jean Piaget and Lawrence Kohlberg (Piaget 1932; Kohlberg 1958).  
These researchers were heavily influenced by Kant.  This is evident given the unique 
position that human beings are believed to hold.  That is, Piaget and Kohlberg posited 
that, unlike other animals, humans possess a unique ability to develop morally 
because of their ability to improve the cognitive skills required to assess morally 
complex issues. 
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Piaget’s classic study, The Moral Judgment of the Child (1932), has provided 
the basis for much research on moral judgment by offering a conceptual framework 
for the study of the development of moral thought.  Piaget’s research introduced a 
two-stage theory.  Younger children (i.e., age 11 or lower) think about rules in fixed 
and absolute terms.  They believe that rules are handed down by adults or God and 
thus they can not be changed. Further, they are consequentialists, drawing moral 
inferences from the consequences of actions.  On the other hand, older children begin 
to make judgments based less on the consequences of an action and more on the 
intentions of the actor (i.e., they become more Kantian or deontological).  Echoing a 
classic example, when a young child hears about a boy who broke 15 cups trying to 
help his mother and about another boy who broke only one cup trying to steal 
cookies, the younger child views the first boy’s offense as worse or less moral, while 
the older child regards the second child as having committed a more immoral offense. 
In his dissertation, Kohlberg expanded on the work of Piaget primarily by 
delineating in greater detail the stages of moral development.  This resulted in an 
expansion of the framework from two to six stages of moral development.  
Kohlberg’s first stage is similar to that of Piaget, while Kohlberg’s second and third 
stages overlap with Piaget’s second stage.  The fourth through the sixth stages of 
moral development reflected entirely new conceptualizations of levels of moral 
development.  The following briefly explains the most important aspects of each 
stage of Kohlberg’s theory of moral development. 
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The first two stages are egocentric in nature.  Stage one judgments are based 
on an assessment of the direct consequences of the person’s actions for him or 
herself. The cue most often used at this stage is punishment: the worse the 
punishment (e.g., the length of the child’s “time-out”), the more immoral the act is 
judged to have been.  Stage two judgments are made based on the question, “What’s 
in it for me?”  In this stage, the presumed “right” action is whichever activity is in the 
individual’s best interest. 
The third and fourth stages are characterized by a shift in attention to the 
individual’s social groups.  In stage three, moral judgments are influenced by the 
need to balance the requirements of mutual social roles (e.g., the need to be a good 
student and a good son or daughter).  In stage four, the influence of the self is further 
reduced as the implications of action for the broader society become more important.  
In this stage, judgments are made based on the need to uphold societal institutions.  
This results in people becoming more concerned with obeying laws and respecting 
authority in order to ensure that social order is maintained. 
The final two stages signify Kohlberg’s highest levels of moral reasoning.  At 
stage five, the individual makes judgments with the concept of a better society in 
mind.  This means that moral decisions are made with the recognition that different 
social groups within a society have different values and that the consideration of these 
values is necessary for making the best judgments.  Hence, at this stage, people 
recognize a need to protect individual rights and settle disputes democratically.  
Democracy, however, does not always result in just outcomes.  At stage six, 
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individuals recognize a higher order of moral laws that define the principles by which 
a society can achieve justice -- a justice that calls for sacrifice of status, power, and/or 
wealth.  Although some people may achieve this level of moral reasoning (e.g., 
Mahatma Ghandi and Mother Teresa), stage five is typically viewed as the highest 
level that anyone can attain (Crain 1985). For this reason, Kohlberg later adjusted his 
model by dropping stage six from his scoring manual and calling it a theoretical stage 
(Colby, Kohlberg, Gibbs and Lieberman 1983). 
The influence of Kohlberg’s model in moral psychology remains evident in 
the current literature (Trevino 1986; Jones 1991; Goolsby and Hunt 1992; Krebs and 
Denton 2006), despite the difficulty of administering Kohlberg’s tool for assessing his 
vision of moral judgment (Colby and Kohlberg 1987).  In the decades that followed, a 
great deal of empirical evidence has accumulated – some in support of, and some in 
opposition of various aspects of the model.  For example, Kohlberg focused on moral 
judgment more than moral behavior.  However, the underlying belief was that people 
should make moral judgments about actual everyday moral issues in the same way 
that they judge hypothetical dilemmas (Krebs and Denton 2005).  Research has 
generally failed to confirm this position (e.g., Wark and Krebs 1996).  This is not 
surprising given the insights learned from decades of research on the relationship 
between attitudes and behaviors, which finds that general attitudes rarely predict 
specific behaviors (e.g., Fishbein and Ajzen 1975). 
Of greater importance to Kohlberg’s model is his position that people progress 
through each stage of the model in the order specified and do not skip a stage or 
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regress to a lower stage once a higher stage has been achieved.  Support for this 
position is weak (Kurtines and Greif 1974).  For example, in an investigation of a 
cross-cultural sample, Holstein (1972) found that while this tenet was generally 
upheld, exceptions are not uncommon.  In addition, an updated model of moral 
cognitive development provided by Harre (1983) is based on the notion that different 
aspects of our social worlds are guided by different rule systems and roles, which 
impact what one may deem as appropriate behavior.  Harre offers an example that 
draws on Kohlberg’s stages of moral development: “The business world is guided by 
a Stage 2 moral order based on instrumental exchange; marriage is guided by a Stage 
3 moral order based on the fulfillment of mutual role expectations; and the legal 
system is guided by a Stage 4 moral order based on maintaining the institutions of 
society” (Krebs and Denton 2005, pg. 633). These observations suggest that because 
of the different roles and expectations inherent in each situation, people move in and 
out of moral orders – not stages of moral development.  This conceptualization is 
inconsistent with the notion that moral cognitive development progressively 
improves, for the ability to be flexible and apply the most appropriate moral thinking 
in a given situation is an indication of moral maturity. 
A review of cognitive approaches to moral thinking would not be complete 
without a brief summary of the work done by Forsyth and his colleagues (e.g., 
Forsyth and Pope 1984; Forsyth 1980). Although Forsyth’s taxonomy of ethical 
ideologies has received far less attention than Kohlberg’s model, Forsyth’s work has 
been influential for two reasons.  First, Forsyth introduced cognitive individual 
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differences that influence moral judgment; in contrast, deontological and utilitarian 
philosophies hypothesize that the basis of moral judgment is unvarying.  Second, 
Forsyth provided evidence that ethical ideologies impact moral judgments as a result 
of the emphasis that people with different ideologies place on various factors. 
   Consistent with the latter premise, Forsyth (1980) introduced a scale called the 
EPQ (Ethics Position Questionnaire) that classifies individuals according to their 
ethical ideology.  In contrast to Kohlberg’s model, the EPQ does not classify ethical 
ideologies solely on the basis of their reliance on principles and therefore it serves as 
a more general typology.  The EPQ classifies people based on the extent to which 
they make judgments in accordance with the theories of idealism or relativism.  As a 
result, the EPQ has been used in empirical investigations that explore more practical 
implications of these two theories (e.g., Aleassa, Pearson and McClurg 2010; Al-
Khatib, Malshe, Sailors and Clark 2011). 
As just noted, the EPQ scale is based on two broad ways of construing moral 
dilemmas: idealism and relativism. These two approaches are orthogonal such that a 
person can be either high in both idealism and relativism, low in both, or represent 
any combination of the two.  Idealism is based on a consequentialist (teleological) 
moral philosophy, while relativism is based on a person’s “principledness,” which 
makes it relatively deontological. 
According to Forsyth and his colleagues, idealists assume that good 
consequences can always be obtained, while less idealistic individuals hold that bad 
consequences are often mixed with good ones.  Relativists believe that universal 
27 
 
moral principles are of little value when making moral judgments because every 
situation requires the assessment of a completely different set of factors, whereas less 
relativistic individuals rely on important fundamental principles.  Forysth’s scale 
identifies four combinations of high and low levels of each of these two factors that 
result in four ethical ideologies.  A brief description of each follows. 
Situationists are high in both idealism and relativism.  As a result, they 
advocate a contextual analysis of morally questionable actions.  Absolutists, on the 
other hand, are also idealistic, but they are not relativistic and thus they use inviolate 
universal moral principles to formulate moral judgments.  Subjectivists, like 
situationists, are relativistic and are therefore skeptical of moral principles.  However, 
they are less idealistic, which leads to a greater expectation of negative consequences, 
such that they prefer to rely on their own personal values when making judgments.  
Finally, exceptionists are neither relativistic nor idealistic.  Although they adhere to 
moral principles, these individuals admit that exceptions must sometimes be made to 
moral absolutes.   
In this way, the preceding typology provides a systematic way to measure the 
impact that these individual ideologies have on important issues (e.g., ethical views in 
social psychology research, Forsyth and Pope 1984).  This typology also 
accommodates findings which suggest that people’s moral philosophical ideologies 
are fluid and subject to change. 
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Evidence of the Malleability of Morality – The Role of Culture 
Empirical research on morality and ethics has relied greatly on the use of vignettes 
that depict morally ambiguous dilemmas (e.g., Kohlberg 1958, 1969).  The 
underlying assumption in such studies has been that people generally agree on what is 
moral or ethical and what is not—a view that contrasts with many findings.  Recently, 
research in cultural psychology (e.g., Miller, Bersoff and Harwood 1990; Shweder, 
Mahapatra, and Miller 1987; Shweder and Sullivan 1993) has investigated the 
validity and implications of this assumption.  Note that the notion that culture impacts 
judgments of morality is not new.  In the 5
th
 century BC, the Greek historian 
Herodotus wrote: “Everyone without exception believes his own native customs, and 
the religion he was brought up in, to be the best; and that being so, it is unlikely that 
anyone but a madman would mock at such things.  There is abundant evidence that 
this is the universal feeling about the ancient customs of one’s country.” Only in the 
last few decades, however, has this assertion been studied empirically and in a 
systematic manner within the domain of morality and ethics. 
Culture can be defined in many ways.  The preponderance of the research 
reviewed, however, investigates culture with respect to shared practices and norms.
2
  
For example, Mazar and Aggarwal (2011) used correlational data to study the 
propensity to offer bribes in 26 different countries.  Their analysis revealed a 
significant negative correlation between a country’s position on the collectivism-
                                                 
2
 In cultural psychology the term “culture” is implicitly defined as a set of meanings, ideas, 
and practices that are largely shared among individuals within some definable population 
(Chiu and Hong, 2006; Chiu, Leung, and Hong, 2010). 
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individualism continuum and the countries’ explicit acceptance of the practice of 
bribery; more collectivistic cultures were more receptive to the acceptance of bribes 
as acceptable business practice.  In a second study, experimental evidence affirmed 
the results of these correlational data: individuals who were primed with a 
collectivistic rather than an individualistic mindset were more likely to engage in 
bribery.  Further, differences in people’s perceived sense of responsibility mediated 
the relationship. 
While most research in morality and ethics has focused on acts that are 
negative, that is, immoral or unethical behavior (Janoff-Bulman, Sheikh and Hepp 
2009), some work has examined the impact of culture on positive morality.  Positive 
morality is behavior that is evaluated as ethical or moral rather than neutral or 
negative.  Specifically, Miller, et al., (1990) investigated people’s perceptions of 
helping others both within a South Asian (Indian) and a North American population.  
These researchers found that while North Americans perceived the decision to help 
friends and strangers in various situations as a matter of personal choice, almost all 
individuals sampled in India perceived that offering such help constituted a moral 
obligation. 
An issue that has received scant attention in the literature involves harmless, 
yet offensive moral violations.  Relevant to this, a series of studies by Eyal, Liberman 
and Trope (2008) examined the impact of psychological distance (i.e., temporal or 
social distance) on people’s judgments of immoral acts.  While they evaluated a 
number of transgressions (e.g., incest, eating the family pet), one of the moral 
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offenses was viewed as harmless albeit culturally repugnant: using a nation’s flag as a 
cleaning cloth.  In an investigation of Israeli undergraduates, the authors found that 
greater psychological distance (i.e., using an Israeli flag as a cleaning cloth in a year 
from now, as opposed to tomorrow) resulted in harsher judgments of the immorality 
of the act.  These researchers hypothesized that this occurred because participants 
relied more greatly on moral principles in evaluating distant events than near ones.  
Haidt, Koller and Dias (1993) also explored these types of moral violations (i.e., 
cultural) and investigated the impact of affect on moral judgments, another relatively 
neglected topic. The role of culture was examined by focusing on individuals of 
relatively high and low socio-economic status (SES) within Brazil and the United 
States. The results of this research indicated that the domain of morality varies cross-
culturally and that even social classes can elicit differences in perceptions of morality.  
Specifically, the authors found that high SES Philadelphians exhibited a harm-based 
morality that was limited to the ethics of autonomy (i.e., disgusting and disrespectful 
actions were not moralized or  viewed as belonging in the domain of morality) as 
long as these actions were perceived to have no harmful interpersonal consequences). 
But for lower SES Philadelphians (and especially Brazilians), morality appeared to be 
conceptualized more broadly. For these individuals, stories that involved disgust and 
disrespect were moralized, even when they were perceived to be harmless. 
Research that explores culture differences in issues involving morality raises 
the broader question of whether goodness exists independently of the norms of a 
particular culture or society.  That is, most people would agree that what people 
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perceive to be right or wrong should be independent of one’s culture.  When we 
condemn slavery or torture, we do not do so simply because the conventions of our 
culture no longer condone such practices.  The conventional view is that there is 
something more profound at stake when we refer to issues of morality.  Although 
academic research rarely studies the universality of certain views given that doing so 
amounts to trying to prove the null hypothesis, some research speaks to this issue. 
Lysonski and Gaidis (1991), who investigated people’s reactions to ethical dilemmas 
in the United States, Denmark, and New Zealand found that regardless of whether the 
dilemmas concerned issues of coercion and control, conflicts of interest, the physical 
environment, paternalism, or personal integrity, respondents’ reactions toward them 
tended to be similar, regardless of individuals’ country of origin. 
While the preceding work seems to imply that our barometer of moral 
behavior may be relatively insensitive to external factors such as one’s culture or the 
particulars of the social situation--a view that generally concurs with older models of 
moral thinking espoused by Kohlberg (1958) and Piaget (1965),  much other research 
calls this thesis into question.  Along these lines, some social scientists (e.g., Van den 
Berghe 1981; Nettle and Dunbar 1997) suggest that cultural markers (e.g., social 
norms of moral behavior) serve a useful evolutionary purpose. Designations of 
cultural membership can play a vital role in facilitating altruistic and cooperative 
behavior toward in-group members.  For example, drawing on a mathematical model 
as evidence, McElreath, Boyd and Richerson (2003, p. 123) contend that social 
behavior in groups is regulated by norms such that interactions among those sharing 
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common versus discordant beliefs about appropriate behavior yield higher payoffs. 
This seems to suggest that many moral judgments not only may be based on these 
norms, but they may be rendered in an automatic or heuristic manner.  This has 
advanced a recent Humean perspective of morality, one asserting that moral intuitions 
are anchored primarily on emotions not reason.  Evolutionary psychologists have 
been at the forefront of this characterization of moral judgment (e.g., Greene and 
Haidt 2002; Haidt, 2001; Rozin et al., 1999). I examine this line of thinking in the 
next and last section of this review of the literature from the field of psychology. 
 
Automaticity and the Emerging Literature from Evolutionary Psychology  
In “The Descent of Man” (1871), Darwin introduced evolutionary biology to 
the domain of morality.  Darwin’s thesis centered on the role of sympathy as a social 
instinct (DeScioli and Kurzban 2009). He argued that sympathy evolved into morality 
as a result of group selection; groups that displayed morality had an advantage over 
those that did not because group success ensues from the cooperation that is spawned 
by agreed-upon (i.e.,  moral) behavior.  Recently, this view of morality has surfaced 
in psychology, with proponents arguing that the study of morality needs to account 
for both cooperation as well as the rivalry between those who cheat versus those who 
aim to catch and punish cheaters (Alexander 1987).  As a result of such thinking, 
much of the research in evolutionary psychology that concerns morality associates 
morality with pro-social attitudes (e.g., De Waal 2009; Moll et al., 2006).  To 
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paraphrase Richards (1987, p. 623-624), evolution constructed human beings to act 
for the common good, and to do so is what it means to be moral.   
The implications of such evolutionary influences on morality are significant.  
They help to explain why many moral judgments appear to be made in a very 
automatic fashion – namely they are rendered using limited or no discernible 
cognitive effort.  In an influential model of moral judgment, Rest (1983) relegated 
cognitive processes involved in rendering moral judgment to a limited role, for he 
proposed that evolutionary forces encourage human beings’ tendency to cooperate.  
As such, morality involves “the equilibrium of individuals in society . . . each 
reciprocating with other individuals according to rules that balance the benefits and 
burdens of cooperation” (Rest 1983, p. 572-573).  Rest further posited that much of 
this process occurs quite automatically, with very little need for deliberation.  A 
recent study using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) supports this view 
about the automaticity of some moral decisions and also bolsters evidence that 
evolutionary forces play an important role.  Specifically, Greene and his colleagues 
(Greene et al.,  2001) asked people to make a series of life or death decisions that 
involved the popular trolley car scenario.
3
  By demonstrating differences in the 
                                                 
3
 A runaway trolley is headed for five people who will be killed if it proceeds on its present 
course. The only way to save them is to hit a switch that will turn the trolley onto an alternate 
set of tracks where it will kill one person instead of five. Should you to switch the trolley to 
the other tracks to save five people at the expense of one? Most people say yes. Now consider 
a similar problem, the footbridge dilemma. As before, a trolley threatens to kill five people. 
You are standing next to a large stranger on a footbridge that spans the tracks, in between the 
oncoming trolley and the five people in its way. In this scenario, the only way to save the five 
people is to push this stranger off the bridge and onto the tracks below. The stranger will die 
if you do this, but his body will stop the trolley from reaching the others. Should you to save 
the five others by pushing this stranger to his death? Most people say no. 
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activation of brain regions that correlate with emotional engagement and cognitive 
reasoning, their research demonstrated that the extent to which a person was involved 
in a moral dilemma influenced the engagement of emotions during their judgment.  
For example, participants’ decisions to sacrifice one person in order to save five 
others was more difficult if the single sacrificed person was a family member versus a 
stranger.  Results also indicated that women were more affected by this emotion-
laden factor than were men.  That is, they were less likely than men to throw a switch 
and kill only their brother rather than to not throw the switch and thereby kill five 
people. 
Perhaps the most influential and controversial research in this area has come 
from the work of Jonathan Haidt and his colleagues (e.g., Greene and Haidt 2002; 
Haidt and Bjorklund 2008; Schnall, Haidt, Clore, and Jordan 2008).  Over the past 
decade, Haidt’s “Social Intuitionist Model” has generated dozens of articles that 
examine the role of affect and automatic/ heuristic processes in moral judgment.  The 
model is based on the contention that moral judgments and actions are the product of 
an evolutionary process in which decisions are based on simple and basic processes 
that are more akin to perception than to higher order cognition (Haidt 2004).  Indeed, 
Haidt claims that the way people make distinctions between what is right and wrong 
is very similar to the way they decide what is beautiful. 
Borrowing from the relatively more recent research in cultural psychology 
(e.g., Miller et al., 1990; Shweder, et al., 1998) and in direct opposition to Kohlberg’s 
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view of moral reasoning, Haidt suggests that people do not reach a moral judgment as 
a result of private moral reasoning. Instead, they rely on some gut feeling, which 
quickly and automatically delivers a moral decision.  Moreover, he holds that these 
judgments are often influenced by contextual cues, such as social or cultural 
circumstances (Haidt 2004).  Although the model recognizes that reasoning can affect 
judgments, it contends that such reasoning plays an extremely limited role.  Rather, 
reasoning is thought to be used as a tool to provide a post-hoc justification of 
decisions. Hence Haidt notes that “moral reasoning is an effortful [or “controlled”] 
process, engaged in after a moral judgment is made, in which a person searches for 
arguments that will support an already-made judgment” (Haidt 2001, p. 822). 
This is an important point because it suggests that the reasons people give to 
explain or support their moral judgments may not accurately reflect the mental 
processes used to derive their choices.  This concurs with other research in 
psychology, which suggests that people have difficulties articulating their own 
internal feelings, thoughts, and reflections (e.g., Nisbett and Wilson 1977).  Hence, 
given that ethical judgments tend to be inherently complex, that individuals’ ability to 
articulate their internal thought processes is learned and not innate, and that 
individuals differ in their ability to engage in such articulation, Haidt advocates 
caution in interpreting evidence for or against his claim concerning people’s post hoc 
justification of their moral decisions.   
  Recall that a key distinction between the work of Hume and his predecessors 
concerns the role that emotion plays in rendering moral judgments.  Much of Haidt’s 
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theory is founded on this notion that emotion or desire can supersede reason in moral 
judgment and action and thereby may result in immoral action.  Several of Haidt’s 
studies have sought support for this position (e.g., Haidt et al., 1993; Schnall et al., 
2008). However, the role of affect in making moral judgments is not yet fully 
understood or accepted. For example, Fine (2006) criticized this position, and Kennett 
and Fine (2009) offered evidence to support such criticism by looking at a context 
wherein the automatic moral judgment was itself morally objectionable.  In these 
studies, when reading scenarios involving negatively stereotyped individuals, people 
were able to successfully override their negative automatic moral judgments through 
moral reasoning despite the negative affect that automatically resulted from reading 
the scenarios.  Thus, counter to Haidt, Kennett and Fine would argue that even the 
additional weight of emotion seems to be insufficient to eliminate the element of 
reasoning in all moral judgment.  
 
Summary of Psychological Literature on Morality and Ethics 
The current review of the psychological literature on the topic of morality 
offers an overview of the approaches adopted by social scientists in their 
investigations of morality and ethics.  In general, this review illustrates that moral 
action has been viewed either as the result of deliberate moral reasoning (e.g., 
deontological or Kohlbergian research), or as the immediate result of automatic action 
tendencies (e.g., evolutionary psychology research), both of which may be mediated 
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by the moral definitions and beliefs embedded in an actor’s social environment (e.g., 
prevailing norms, the actor’s social class, or his/her culture).  
The Kohlbergian, or deontological, view of moral reasoning, which 
emphasizes the underlying role of cognitive deliberation, has been supported by a line 
of psychological investigation with a great history of research.  Based on this 
perspective, moral functioning is rational and it is based on the need to understand the 
fundamental goals of human beings and the means they use to pursue them.  The 
crucial elements of this line of thought are rules and principles for human behavior 
and attention to the predicted or observed consequences of moral behavior.   
In another view of moral action, behavior is the result of action tendencies.  
This position has been supported by significantly less empirical research and, in large 
part, has emerged from the recent application of evolutionary theory in psychology.  
This research generally emphasizes the role of cooperation and pro-social attitudes as 
an adaptation to one’s physical and social environment.  As a result, evolutionary 
psychologists view the function of moral tendencies as serving the singular purpose 
of the species’ survival.  This line of research suggests the existence of an innate 
mechanism in which cognitive deliberation is used to the extent that it produces post-
hoc justifications of morally relevant behavior.  Hence, from this point of view, moral 
action is essentially irrational; it is based on “moral emotions and moral intuitions 
that are not anchored in reason” (Kahneman and Sustein 2005). This logic suggests 
that moral action is different from morally neutral action only in terms of specific 
content categories. Action is moral because of its “good” content (e.g., helping) or 
38 
 
because of the social function that is served (e.g., enhancing social cohesion; Hogan 
1973); it differs from morally neutral action that offers neither.  What is clear from 
these two viewpoints as well as the other literature reviewed in this chapter (e.g., 
cultural psychology) is that we are still far from identifying a definitive answer to the 
question of what is the most accurate representation of the moral judgments and 
activities in everyday life. 
One factor that may be contributing to the elusive nature of research in moral 
behavior is that the study of morality and ethics in psychology has been limited by its 
almost complete reliance on self-reported predictions of behavior and assessments of 
third party dilemmas.  Although few would limit the study of moral issues to 
objectively observable behavior, there is a real need to assess and evaluate actual 
behavior.  Fortunately, some recent progress has been made in addressing this issue 
(e.g., Zhong and Liljenquist 2006; Vohs and Schooler 2008; Mazar et al., 2008).  
Still, the nature of moral action makes real life investigation challenging, and this has 
contributed to this significant gap in the literature.  Moral action is complex as it is 
accompanied by a variety of feelings, questions, doubts, assessments, and decisions, 
and all are imbedded within a cultural context that can further influence assessments 
of the morality of any issue.  These sources of complexity make the empirical 
investigation of real moral behavior challenging because it is nearly impossible to 
account for (i.e., control or vary) all of these influences.  Presumably this explains the 
heavy reliance on normative models and atheoretical research that is evident in the 
marketing literature, which I will review in the last section of this chapter. 
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As alluded to earlier, the goal of most marketing researchers is simply to 
understand the actual behavior of consumers and marketing professionals in real-
world settings by investigating practical factors (e.g., organizational size, corporate 
norms, etc.) that impact these behaviors.  As a result, like psychologists, such 
researchers do not endorse any particular philosophical position in their research (i.e., 
deontological versus consequentialist).  The benefit of this approach is that many of 
marketers’ models incorporate both deliberative and automatic processes in moral 
thinking.  Still, this approach has come at a cost because it is often atheoretical. As a 
result, it provides little evidence about the underlying sources of the relationships 
identified between predictive variables and behavior. The review that follows 
provides an overview of both the models of moral judgment offered by researchers in 
marketing, and it identifies several important individual and environmental factors 
that can affect moral decision-making. 
 
2.3 REVIEW OF LITERATURE IN MARKETING 
As is the case in the psychology literature, research in marketing uses the 
terms morals and ethics quite interchangeably, making little attempt to distinguish the 
two. For example, four models discussed in this section (those by Ferrell and 
Gresham 1985; Trevino 1986; Hunt and Vitell 1986; and Dubinsky and Loken 1989) 
offer no definitions of the terms.  This treatment of the two topics appears to stem 
from a lack of consensus about what distinguishes the two (for discussions of this, see 
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Cavanagh, Moberg, and Velasquez 1981, Beauchamp and Bowie 1979, or Jones 
1980). 
Regardless of how one defines the two terms, morality and ethics are typically 
viewed as particularly relevant to marketing.  Several researchers have speculated 
about a unique role that ethics plays in marketing.   Miles (1980) suggested that 
marketers assume boundary-spanning responsibilities, which necessitates assimilating 
the needs of multiple parties with competing interests.  Environments of this sort may 
be particularly conducive to unethical behavior.  Others argue that marketing 
practitioners are more visible to persons external to the organization they represent, 
making them more susceptible to criticism (Ferrell and Gresham 1985).  Still others 
contend that marketing simply attracts individuals who have questionable ethics 
(Cox, Goodman, and Fichlander 1965).  This last point led Goolsby and Hunt (1992) 
to compare the cognitive moral development of managers in marketing to those of 
other social groups.  Contrary to the charge, these researchers found that marketing 
practitioners compared favorably with the other groups. 
Given the prevailing view that morality and ethics is of considerable relevance 
to marketing, it is not surprising that a fair amount of research on this topic has been 
reported by researchers in marketing.  Indeed, Murphy and Laczniak (1981) listed 
nearly 100 articles in marketing that dealt with morals and ethics.  Most of these 
investigations focused on the practical implications and applications of ethics in 
marketing. Although such inquiry can be of value, there appears to be a clear dearth 
of research that is either theory driven or empirical.  Indeed, a computerized search I 
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conducted on the topic of morality and ethics that included the major consumer and 
marketing journals over the last 40 years uncovered the following. Journal of 
Consumer Research published a total of five such articles and only two were 
empirical, Journal of Consumer Psychology offered three papers on this topic and 
two of these were empirical, Journal of Marketing Research published two papers on 
this subject matter where one was empirical and the other descriptive (i.e., survey 
based), and Journal of Marketing reported nine such articles although only four were 
empirical and the rest were either descriptive or they involved normative models.  
The relative dearth of theory driven or empirical research on this topic suggests that 
our understanding of morals or ethics related issues in marketing remains quite 
shallow, offering little insight into important “why” or “how” questions and into the 
underlying mechanisms.  
For the most part, the research in marketing has emphasized one of three 
broad foci. The first involves non-empirical work that endeavors to provide 
descriptive or prescriptive models of ethical decision-making for marketing 
practitioners (e.g., Ferrell and Gresham 1985). I begin my review of the marketing 
literature by providing a brief assessment of each of these models.  In addition, two 
other streams of research have investigated pertinent factors that can influence ethical 
behavior: situational or environmental factors (e.g., Ford and Richardson 1994; 
Murphy, Smith, and Daley 1992), and the role played by individual differences (e.g., 
Hegarty and Sims 1978; Mazar and Aggarwal 2011).  I conclude this section with a 
brief review of these areas of inquiry.   
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Although there is very little research in marketing that investigates the ethical 
decision-making of consumers per se -- a topic that my dissertation will explore, I 
shall review the relevant consumer behavior research that exists within the various 
sections of this review (i.e., individual differences and environmental factors).  I 
begin now, however, with a brief description of the more influential models that have 
been offered in the marketing literature. 
  
Influential Models of Ethical Behavior in the Marketing Literature 
A review of the literature in marketing reveals five influential models of 
ethical behavior.  Each of these draws or builds on models originally developed by 
scholars in psychology (e.g., Kohlberg 1958; Fishbein et al., 1975).  The first model 
(Trevino 1986) is a general theoretical model.  Three others focus either explicitly on 
marketing ethics (Ferrell and Gresham 1985; Hunt and Vitell 1986) or on individual 
decision-making within the specific context of marketing ethics (Dubinsky and Loken 
1989).  A final model by Jones (1991) represents a conceptualization of individual 
decision-making of ethical issues, yet this model uniquely takes into account the 
intensity of the ethical issue. 
Trevino’s model (1986) is a person-situation interactionist model.  It begins 
with the realization that an ethical dilemma is present.  The individual then 
deliberates on the “best” course of action.  Deliberation is dependent on an 
individual’s level of cognitive moral development (Kohlberg 1958). A moral 
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judgment is made in the cognitive stage, and it is moderated by individual and 
situational factors, which leads directly an appropriate response (i.e., behavior). 
Three other models focus specifically on marketing ethics. Ferrell and 
Gresham’s model (1985) provides a contingency framework for ethical decision 
making in marketing.  In this model, the contingency factors that affect the decision 
maker concern the individual (i.e., the person’s knowledge, values, attitudes, and 
intentions) and ones that relate to the organization (i.e., significant others and 
opportunity). Like Trevino’s model, the decision subsequently results in an 
appropriate action on the part of the decision-maker. 
Hunt and Vitell’s model (1986) is more elaborate than the former and relies 
on both deontological and teleological thinking. This model consists of several stages.  
In the first stage, personal experiences and environmental factors (i.e., cultural, 
industrial, and organizational) influence the individual’s ability to identify the 
existence of an ethical problem, alternative responses to it, and the consequences of 
the alternative responses.  In turn, resulting perceptions together with deontological 
norms and an evaluation of the potential consequences lead to both deontological and 
consequentialist evaluations, wherein the potential consequences of the moral 
decision are evaluated and moral intent is established. Finally, the authors do not 
suggest any consequences of this stage on future ethical activities; that is, there is no 
feed-back loop in their model in which actual consequences impact future 
evaluations. 
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The last in the set of the three marketing ethics models is a conceptualization 
offered by Dubinsky and Loken (1989).  This model is unique for two reasons.  First, 
it is the only model that is theory driven, in that it is based on the theory of reasoned 
action (Fishbein et al., 1975). Second, it is the only model that has been empirically 
validated (using a survey of field sales personnel). The Dubinsky and Loken model 
begins with an assessment of the variables that affect attitudes towards ethical or 
unethical behavior: behavioral beliefs and outcome evaluations (i.e., deontological 
and consequentialist considerations).  The model then assesses the two variables that 
affect subjective norms regarding ethical or unethical behavior, namely normative 
beliefs and a motivation to comply. Finally, attitude and subjective norms contribute 
to intentions to engage in ethical or unethical behavior, which in turn affect actual 
behavior. 
Finally, Jones (1991) offered a model of individual ethical behavior that is 
unique, for it emphasizes the role of the actual moral issue in the decision-making 
process.  Jones’ Issue Contingent Model (ICM) posits that moral issues vary in their 
moral intensity; in contrast to the previous models of ethical decision making, the 
ICM explicitly recognizes characteristics of the moral issue itself as either an 
independent variable or a moderating variable.  The ICM identifies six components 
that determine the moral intensity of an issue: magnitude of consequences, social 
consensus, probability of effect, temporal immediacy, proximity, and concentration of 
effect. 
45 
 
To summarize, in all models except that of Ferrell and Gresham (1985), some 
form of moral judgment stage exists.  In Trevino’s (1986) model, Kohlberg’s model 
of the stages of cognitive moral development is the critical element in the judgment 
phase.  Hunt and Vitell (1986) and Dubinsky and Loken (1989) rely on 
consequentialist and deontological evaluations in their models.  Also, the models 
differ in their transitions from moral judgment to behavior.  Ferrell and Gresham 
(1985) and Trevino (1986) suggested that the judgment phase leads directly to 
behavior, while the other three models include a step in which the individual 
establishes moral intent before engaging in any behavior (Rest 1986; Dubinsky and 
Loken 1989; and Hunt and Vitell 1986).  Finally, Jones’ model (1991) makes a 
unique contribution by delineating the role that a moral issue can itself play in the 
decision-making process.  Jones’ model identifies multiple elements that determine 
the moral intensity of an issue and the impact that each of these has on a person’s 
intention to act.   Importantly, only Dubinsky and Loken (1989) provide empirical 
evidence for the validity of their model.  
 
Individual Differences in Marketing Ethics 
The marketing literature has uncovered a number of individual differences 
that can impact the ethical judgments or actions of consumers and marketing 
practitioners.  For example, McNichols and Zimmerman (1985) found that the 
strength of a person’s religious beliefs is positively related to the strength of their 
ethical standards. In an investigation of the effect of extrinsic rewards on graduate 
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students’ unethical behavior, Hegarty and Sims (1978) found that providing such 
incentives for unethical behavior increased cheating.  In addition, these researchers 
also measured a number of individual difference variables. They found that locus of 
control, economic and political value orientation, and Machiavellianism were all 
significant covariates of the unethical behaviors spawned by the incentives. 
Individual social factors also have been found to affect ethics in marketing.  
Along these lines, Chonko and Hunt (1985) observed that higher level managers were 
less likely to perceive ethical problems, while similar research by Delaney and 
Sockell (1992) found that lower level managers were more pessimistic about the 
ethical character of the organization.  Adding to this, a review by Ford and 
Richardson reported that, in general, as an employee’s level in the organization 
increases, his or her ethical beliefs and decisions decrease. 
Research also has identified three important individual differences from social 
psychology that can impact ethical behavior in marketing contexts – self-monitoring, 
social dominance orientation, and right-wing authoritarianism.  Miller, deTurck, and 
Kalbfleisch (1983) found that high versus low self-monitors were more successful at 
deceiving others.  To explain this, they conjecture that because unlike high self-
monitors, low self-monitors are guided primarily by internal cues, they possess little 
experience deceiving others.  More recently, Hing, Bobocel, Zanna and McBride 
(2007) observed that leaders high, versus low, in social dominance orientation who 
partnered with agreeable followers made decisions that were more unethical.  They 
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also found that followers high rather than low in right-wing authoritarianism were 
more acquiescent and supportive of an unethical leader. 
Blasi (1984) proposed that being a moral person could be an important part of 
a person’s self-definition.  Building on this, Aquino and Reed (2002) posited that the 
idea of being a good person – that is, possessing a moral identity – could occupy 
different levels of centrality in people’s self-concepts.  Hence, they identified a scale 
that measures a person’s moral identity.  Further, they predicted and found that moral 
identity was related to the frequency with which people engage in activities that 
benefit others, and people higher in moral identity report a stronger sense of freely 
choosing to engage in these activities (Aquino, McFerran and Laven 2011). 
Finally, more than any other variable, sex differences in ethical issues have 
been reported (Ford et al., 1994).  For example, Betz, O-Connell, and Shepard (1989) 
found that male business school students were more than twice as likely as female 
students to engage in actions regarded as unethical.  Further, a literature review 
reported by Ford et al., (1994) found that half of the studies they examined revealed 
that females acted more ethically than males, while the other half reported no sex 
differences.  Finally, although not in marketing, psychologist Gilligan (1982) 
observed sex differences in children and suggested that boys and girls interpret moral 
dilemmas differently. Females conceptualize such dilemmas more complexly, 
viewing them as problems involving interwoven tradeoffs or contingencies that invite 
empathy and compassion. On the other hand, males view moral dilemmas more 
baldly and perceive them as basic problems that involve right versus wrong.  
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Environmental Factors in Marketing Ethics 
Another major stream of inquiry in marketing within the moral domain has 
investigated situational and environmental variables.  In general, the research in this 
area has focused on one of three factors: social factors (e.g., peer beliefs/behaviors), 
organizational factors (e.g., company size), and reward-punishment mechanisms (e.g., 
the existence of corporate codes of conduct). 
In the area of social factors, Zey-Ferrell, Weaver and Ferrell (1979) found that 
respondents’ perceptions or beliefs about their peers’ ethical behavior was the best 
predictor of their own ethical actions. In a review of the literature, Ford et al., (1994) 
found that not only did the behavior of supervisors and one’s peers significantly 
influence individual ethical behavior, but so did one’s industry’s ethical climate. 
Specifically, people who were employed in industries with higher ethical norms 
tended to behave more ethically.  
Substantial evidence also points to the role of organizational size on ethical 
behavior.  Using data from a survey of 149 companies in a major U.S. service 
industry, Murphy, Smith and Daley (1992) found that, other than attitudes, company 
size exhibited the strongest effect on predictions of ethical behavior.  Specifically, 
smaller firms tended to demonstrate more ethical behavior in marketing issues.  More 
broadly, Ford et al., (1994, p.217) reported that “as the size of an organization 
increases, individual ethical beliefs and decision making behavior decreases.”  
49 
 
A third area that has received much attention in marketing literature involves 
the influence of punishment and reward mechanisms. In general, standards, policies, 
or rules have been demonstrated to curb unethical behavior in a number of settings 
and through a variety of methods.  For example, in a study mentioned earlier, Hegarty 
et al., (1978) found that classroom cheating increased when incentives to do so were 
greater.  And while a literature review by Ford et al., (1994) led to the conclusion that 
formal company policy does influence ethical behavior (p. 216), a survey 
administered by Chonko et al., (1985) to over 400 marketing managers confirmed that 
this also appeared to be true for individuals involved in marketing.   
Recently, evidence has been provided to suggest that some level of cognitive 
awareness must be attained before the aforementioned types of policies can influence 
ethical behavior.  Mazar, Amir and Ariely (2008) investigated the role that attention 
to rules or standards has on self-concept maintenance, and they examined actual 
ethical behavior.  In one study, individuals were asked to recall either the Ten 
Commandments or ten books that they had read in high school.  Compared to people 
who recalled high school books, those who recalled the Ten Commandments cheated 
significantly less.   In another study, the authors manipulated whether the opportunity 
for dishonest behavior occurred in terms of money or in terms of an intermediary 
form of exchange (i.e., tokens).  They posited that introducing an intermediary 
medium would offer participants more room for interpretation of their actions, 
making the moral implications of dishonesty less accessible and thus making 
participants more prone to cheat when currency magnitudes are higher.  Consistent 
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with this prediction, introducing tokens as the medium of exchange further increased 
the magnitude of dishonesty.  This final study is noteworthy as it is one of a small 
group of empirical investigations in this domain that employ theory to investigate 
ethical issues in marketing.  While it is clear that there is a dearth of theory-driven 
research, some recent inquiries suggest that this may be changing (e.g., Mazar et al., 
2008; Zhong and Liljenquist 2006).   
The nascent work in psychology examined in this section that explores the 
role of affect and evolutionary processes in the domain of morality and ethics may 
represent a fertile substantive area of inquiry for researchers in marketing. Also, while 
we possess considerable knowledge about the environmental factors and individual 
differences that affect ethical behavior, more rigorously developed theory-guided 
research in the area of marketing ethics is needed.  My own research begins to 
address this gap and does so by drawing on research concerning psychological 
distance and construal level theory (Liberman et al., 2008). I shall begin by briefly 
discussing such theories and work and in so doing develop my own hypothesis about 
the effects of changes in construal level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
51 
 
Chapter Three 
HYPOTHESIS AND OBSERVED EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
 
3.1 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND: CONSTRUAL LEVEL THEORY 
Construal Level Theory (CLT; Liberman, Trope and Stephan 2007; Liberman 
et al., 2008) contends that the meaning people attach to events and actions changes as 
a function of whether these items are mentally represented at a high or low level of 
construal.  High level construals are representations that are more abstract and 
frequently address the “why” of the situation; that is, high level construal retains the 
central or most important features of a situation, yet it omits those that are incidental 
or pertain to the particulars.  In contrast, low level construals are concrete and more 
specific in nature, often dwelling on the “how” of the situation; they emphasize 
concrete details that contextualize the situation (Carver and Scheier 1981, 1990, 
1999; Vallacher and Wegner 1987).  To exemplify, consider a consumer who is 
thinking about purchasing a large recreational play set for the backyard.  If the 
consumer construes this purchase at a high, abstract construal level, (s)he is apt to 
contemplate the central issue of why the play set may be of value. This high level 
construal is likely to lead the consumer to view the product in terms of its desirability 
and regard it as, say, convenient exercise equipment for children.  Alternatively, if the 
consumer construes the backyard play set at a low, more concrete level, thoughts 
might focus on how one might obtain the outdoor play set.  This low level construal 
might lead the consumer to view the play set in terms of its feasibility and, as a result, 
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consider the time it might require to assemble the particular swings, slide, and 
monkey bars.  
 A sizable stream of research has focused on identifying factors that can 
influence people’s construal level. One especially crucial factor is psychological 
distance; as psychological distance increases, people’s construal level heightens. This 
relationship between construal level and psychological distance has been illustrated 
along several different dimensions of psychological distance. Psychological distance 
refers to the subjective gap (i.e., in time, space, familiarity, or likelihood) that 
separates an event or object from the direct, personally experienced, and well known 
reality of the here and now.  Some of the more commonly used inductions used to 
operationalize psychological distance are temporal distance (Liberman and Trope 
1998), spatial distance (Fujita et al., 2006), social distance (Small and Simonsohn 
2006) and probabilistic likelihood (Todorov, Goren and Trope 2007; Wakslak, Trope, 
Liberman and Alony 2006). Yet, importantly, regardless of the dimension in which it 
may operate, the gap that embodies psychological distance always takes as its 
reference point the self’s personal or egocenentric reality of the here and now 
(Liberman and Forster 2009; Trope and Liberman 2010). As such, it follows that 
explicit consideration of the self and thoughts about the self are likely to be concrete, 
richly detailed, and invite an exceptionally low construal level. 
A key and highly consequential premise surrounding psychological distance is 
that a crucial relationship exists between it and construal level. Entities that are more 
distal or remote from the personal and direct experience of the self are construed at a 
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higher or more abstract level.  In contrast, those that are grounded in the personal 
experience of the self are construed at a very concrete low level (Liberman et al., 
2007; Liberman et al., 2008). This relationship presumably emerges because people 
generally possess not only less but less detailed knowledge about entities that are 
more distant. Hence, this lack of specific knowledge about people, places, events or 
alternatives that are more remote effectively requires that individuals represent them 
in a more abstract and less contextualized (i.e., less detailed) manner. 
 A growing stream of research has firmly demonstrated that variations in 
psychological distance can alter people’s construal level (e.g., Liberman and Forster 
2009; Stapel and Semin 2007).  A remote (near) psychological distance prompts 
people to adopt a high (low) construal level.  Of particular importance, however, is 
evidence which shows that by altering construal level, psychological distance can 
prompt people to differentially attend to, emphasize, and make dominant use of 
alternative aspects of goal derived behavior (Eyal, Sagristano, Trope, Liberman, and 
Chaiken 2009).  The aspects of interest concern the behavior’s desirability versus its 
feasibility.  The desirability of behavior represents a high construal level feature for it 
refers to the general or overarching value of a behavior’s end-state (i.e., the value of 
the overall objective that one wishes to attain).  An example of this was illustrated 
earlier in the discussion of how a consumer who adopts a high construal level would 
focus on  a play set’s value and hence might represent the backyard play set as 
convenient exercise equipment.  On the other hand, feasibility centers on the 
particular means that are used to reach the end-state, and for this reason it represents a 
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lower level feature in that it dwells on the particular method used to accomplish the 
objective.  This too was exemplified in the backyard play set illustration where a 
consumer who adopts a low construal level might consider the set’s feasibility and 
hence the time required to assemble the play set’s specific products (i.e., the swings, 
slide, and monkey bar).   
Given the established thesis that a more remote (near) psychological distance 
prompts people to use a high (low) construal level, it makes sense that individuals are 
apt to attach greater importance to, and/or will be more influenced by the desirability 
(feasibility) aspects of a situation as psychological distance increases (decreases).  
Indeed, findings that affirm this outcome have been reported by a number of 
researchers.  Along such lines, Liberman and Trope (1998) found that people’s 
preference for an easy (feasible) but uninteresting (undesirable) assignment decreased 
over time, whereas their preference for a hard (low feasibility) but interesting 
(desirable) assignment increased over time.  Similarly, Freitas, Salovey and Liberman 
(2001) observed that informative but unflattering feedback was preferred for the 
distant future, whereas uninformative but flattering feedback was preferred for the 
near future.  Thus, the crucial thesis evident in these papers is that emphasis on 
desirability concerns grows over time, while feasibility concerns become less 
prominent in the more distant future. 
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3.2 DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESIS 
The preceding observations are not only intriguing, but they seem to suggest a 
theoretical basis for anticipating how people are likely to respond to situations that 
involve ethically questionable behavior. The research on construal level suggests that 
temporal and social distance represent two useful ways of altering psychological 
distance and thus people’s construal level.  In particular, events that occur at a more 
temporally remote time (i.e., they will take place in a month vs. next weekend) or that 
involve actors other than the self (i.e., someone else vs. you) should be perceived at a 
higher and more abstract construal level.  Importantly too, when people engage in 
unethical goal directed behavior, they generally do so because their behaviors enable 
them to achieve a desirable higher level end-state or goal, even though the particular 
means used to make feasible that end-state are unethical.  Given research which 
attests that people’s assessments about goal derived behavior are likely to be 
particularly sensitive to and guided by desirability concerns (i.e., the favorableness of 
the overarching end-state) when they construe an event at a high level, whereas they 
are likely to be driven by feasibility concerns (i.e., the means used to make the end-
state possible) when people construe the event at a low level (Liberman and Trope 
1998, 2003), I reasoned that people’s responses to goal related situations that entail 
unethical behavior should vary as a function of the psychological distance of the 
situation. Specifically, when individuals anticipate how an unknown and thus socially 
distal person will react, they should adopt a relatively high construal level. And 
because such a construal should prompt them to focus on a goal’s desirability -- not 
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on the feasibility of means used to attain the goal, they should anticipate that even 
more unethical actions are likely to occur when the event will take place at a more 
distal versus near moment in time. This follows because the more distal timing further 
magnifies the use of a high construal level. On the other hand, when individuals 
indicate how they themselves will respond to such situations, they should focus quite 
firmly on the highly familiar and concrete here and now (low psychological distance) 
and adopt a very low construal level. This follows because here the actor is the self, 
who actually represents the low construal reference point from which psychological 
distance is gauged. As such, relatively minor variations in the temporal distance of 
the situation are likely to exert either a small or no significant impact on individuals’ 
very low construal level. Hence, when individuals indicate how they themselves will 
respond to ethically questionable situations, I expect that they will engage in low 
construal level thinking regardless of variations in temporal distance. As a result, they 
should anticipate that the self will engage in a low degree of unethical action owing to 
their guiding attention to means and feasibility concerns (i.e., the unethical means 
used to accomplish the objective).  
In the preceding discussion, I cast my predictions in a way that was particular 
to situations where temporal distance is varied. I did this because temporal distance is 
one of the inductions I use to operationalize psychological distance in my studies. 
However, in my later studies, I will manipulate psychological distance and construal 
level in other ways. For this reason, I now reframe my logic more broadly to 
encompass factors other than temporal distance that may moderate people’s 
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anticipation about the potentially (un)ethical behaviors performed by others or the 
self.  To this end, I hypothesize that individuals’ construal of an ethically 
questionable situation should alter their anticipations by influencing the importance 
ascribed to the desirability versus the feasibility of the event. When individuals 
consider the behavior of an unknown (distal) person, which fosters the use of a 
relatively high construal level, I propose that they will anticipate that this person will 
engage in a higher degree of unethical behavior when their perception of the event’s 
psychological (e.g., temporal or experiential) distance is greater. But when 
individuals consider the behavior of the self—an entity that fosters adoption of a very 
low construal level, they should anticipate that the self will largely eschew unethical 
behavior, irrespective of variation in perceived psychological (e.g., temporal or 
experiential) distance of the event.  
 
3.3 EXPERIMENT 1 
Study 1 was designed to provide a preliminary test of my theorizing.  More 
specifically, it investigated whether individuals’ expectations of goal directed 
behavior that involves unethical actions will differ as a function of their construal 
level. To assess this, nine scenarios were created and presented to participants (see 
appendix A).  A few of these scenarios were taken from prior research (Fullerton, 
Kerch and Dodge 1996; Lysonski and Gaidia 1991), but most were developed 
expressly for this investigation. Care was taken in creating the scenarios to ensure that 
none of the unethical behaviors was either extremely deplorable (i.e., clearly wrong) 
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nor highly acceptable (i.e., devoid of any ethical dilemma). In addition, attempts were 
made to employ scenarios to which the student participants could relate (e.g., 
scenarios involving business decisions by high level managers were not used).  In 
each, a focal individual wished to achieve a desired goal but s/he contemplated doing 
so by engaging in ethically questionable means or actions.  I predicted that 
participants who adopted a higher (lower) construal level would be more sensitive to 
the desirability of the end state (the means of goal achievement and feasibility); in 
turn, this should prompt these participants to expect that the focal individual will 
engage in a heightened (lower) degree of unethical behavior. 
In each scenario, participants’ construal level was altered by employing two 
different psychological distance manipulations.  The first manipulation entailed 
altering the social distance (i.e., familiarity or knowledge) of the protagonist: the 
focal individual was either the self or an unknown other.  The protagonist in the 
unknown other condition was referred to by employing gender neutral first names 
(e.g., Chris, Jessie). Because the self is extremely familiar and serves as the here and 
now low construal level reference point when determining psychological distance 
(Trope et al., 2010), it should stimulate a strong and potent low construal level. 
However, an unknown person who is unfamiliar and distal from the self should 
induce a relatively high construal level. The second manipulation used to alter 
construal level was the temporal distance of the event that was described. The events 
were said to take place either next weekend (inducing a low construal level) or next 
month (inducing a high construal level). Hence, the design of study 1 was a 2 (social 
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distance: self or unknown other) by 2 (temporal distance: this weekend or next 
month) between subjects factorial. 
Study 1 was conducted in a computer lab where 114 students completed the 
study in groups ranging from 4 to 8 people.  Participants were seated at computers 
and directed to a URL, which randomly assigned them to treatments. The treatments 
were defined by the study’s 2 (social distance: self vs. unknown other) by 2 (temporal 
distance: this weekend vs. next month) factorial design.  Participants read the nine 
scenarios and for each, they assessed the likelihood that the focal individual would 
behave in an unethical manner. Responses were obtained using 9-point scales 
anchored by 1=definitely would not and 9=definitely would engage in the behavior. 
Hence, higher scores reflect the expectation of less ethical behavior. After responding 
to the nine scenarios, participants were asked to evaluate each of the same nine 
scenarios again, but “this time to make a judgment about the behavior.” Specifically, 
participants were asked to “decide how right or wrong it would be” to behave in the 
manner described on a nine-point scale anchored by 1=absolutely fine and 
9=absolutely wrong. Hence, a higher number represented a more negative (i.e., 
unethical) evaluation of the behavior. The manipulations employed in the scenarios 
presented for this task corresponded with those that participants responded to 
previously.    
After completing this task, participants responded to three scales that sought 
to shed light on the role that self-presentation concerns may have played on 
participants’ predictions of ethical behavior. More specifically, in the self condition, it 
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is possible that individuals may eschew unethical behavior, not because the self 
invokes a very low construal level as I predicted, but instead because reference to the 
self elevates participants’ desire to present themselves favorably to either oneself or 
other people. 
The first scale investigated the potential role of an individual’s motivation to 
make him or herself “look better.” Paulhus (1984) has established a measure of this 
systematic response bias, called the Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding 
(BIDR; Paulhus 1984). The BIDR is composed of two distinct aspects of desirability 
responding: social desirability and impression management. These two aspects are 
assessed using separate subscales; the social desirability subscale consists of 20 items 
that assess an individual’s dispositional tendency to think of him or herself in a 
favorable light (appendix B). Participants who score high on this scale have been 
found to claim more familiarity with bogus products, over-confidence in memory-
based judgments, and exhibit a greater illusion of control (Paulhus and Reid 1991; 
Paulhus 1988). The second component of desirability responding is impression 
management (appendix C).  This subscale also contains 20 items, and it measures 
people’s deliberate attempt to distort responses in order to present a more favorable 
image to other people. This component reflects a more conscious motivation to obtain 
social approval. 
After completing the BIDR, participants responded to another scale, a 13-item 
self-monitoring scale (Lennox and Wolfe 1984; Appendix D). I reasoned that this 
scale also could shed light on self-presentation concerns. Self-monitoring pertains to 
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the extent that individuals are concerned with how others perceive them in social 
settings (Snyder 1974). High self-monitors are more concerned with impressing 
others and receiving social approval. As a result, they often change their behavior in 
different situations. Low self-monitors are less concerned about how others perceive 
them and instead are more guided by their own internal beliefs, attitudes and 
dispositions. Thus, while high self-monitors often view an adjustment of their own 
behavior as appropriate and necessary, low self-monitors consider self-presentations 
that are inconsistent from their internal states as inauthentic and undesirable (Snyder 
and Gangestad 2000). 
The third and final scale measured individual differences in social-interest. 
This scale was included because of the potentially important role that participants’ 
concern with the interests and welfare of others could play in contexts that involve 
ethics. Social interest was evaluated by requiring participants to make choices 
between pairs of self-descriptive terms (Crandall 1991; Appendix E). For each pair, 
participants were asked, for example, if they “would rather be… helpful or 
imaginative.” Each pair included one item that was closely related to social interest 
(i.e., helpful) and another that was somewhat less relevant (i.e., imaginative). Social 
interest was evaluated by analyzing the responses to 15 item pairs; in addition, 9 
buffer or filler pairs were also included to obscure the scale’s focus. Participants saw 
all three scales in the order that I have discussed them, but the items comprising each 
scale were presented randomly. 
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Results 
I first examined participants’ judgments of how right or wrong they felt each 
behavior described in the scenarios was (i.e., how ethical it was). Their mean 
judgments about these behaviors ranged from 4.14 (i.e., taking markers from work for 
a school project) to 7.57 (i.e., releasing pollution into the air at night; see table 1), 
suggesting that the scenario behaviors were viewed as moderately but not excessively 
unethical. These judgments were negatively correlated with the key dependent 
variable, participants’ predictions of unethical behavior (all p’s < .01). In other words, 
as would be expected, participants predicted less ethical behavior when the behavior 
was judged as being more acceptable. In addition, a MANOVA investigated whether 
the two construal level manipulations (social distance and temporal distance) affected 
participants’ judgments of each behavior’s acceptability. Results showed that neither 
of these factors nor their interaction influenced these judgments (ps > .30). 
Next, a MANOVA investigated the key dependent measure, participants’ 
predictions about their own or others’ ethical behavior in the scenarios.  Results 
revealed a main effect of both focal individual (F(1, 102) = 3.90, p < .01) and 
temporal distance (F(1, 102) = 4.06, p < .01), as well as a significant interaction of 
these two factors (F(1, 102) = 1.91, p = .058; see Figure 1). This interaction was 
significant or approached significance for six of the nine scenarios (ps ranged from 
.01 to .14). Follow-up analysis of the overall two-way interaction revealed that when 
construal level was relatively high because the focal person was an unknown distal 
other, participants anticipated that they would engage in less ethical behavior when 
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temporal distance was far rather than close (which prompted the use of an even higher 
construal level; MFar = 6.16 vs. MClose = 4.53, p < .01).  However, when the focal 
person was the highly familiar self, which should activate the use of a very low 
construal level, participants anticipated low levels of unethical behavior , irrespective 
of variations in temporal distance (MFar = 4.47 vs. MClose = 4.36, p > .50). These 
results conform with my hypotheses. 
 
______________________ 
Insert Figure 1 About Here 
______________________ 
 
I then examined whether self presentation concerns could potentially account 
for participants’ predictions about how (un)ethically the target person in the scenarios 
would behave.  I began by analyzing the possible relationship between the measure of 
social interest as well as the three scales I administered that concerned self-
presentation and the two manipulated factors that I found affected participants’ 
predictions about ethical behavior.  This analysis was conducted in two steps. First, 
four mixed linear regressions evaluated the relationship between each scale as well as 
the associated interaction terms with social distance and temporal distance. These 
models revealed no significant results. That is, none of the main effects (ps > .10) or 
the interactions (ps > .10) were significant. In the second step, the effects of each 
individual scale were evaluated (i.e., self-monitoring, social interest, and both BIDR 
sub-scales, where the latter two subscales are called impression management and 
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social desirability) by simultaneously including all four in a MANCOVA. This 
analysis revealed only a single significant main effect of impression management 
(F(1,97) = 1.94, p < .05). The relationship between this factor and predicted ethical 
behavior was investigated by performing a spotlight analysis at plus and minus one 
standard deviation from the mean of impression management responses. Planned 
comparisons revealed that participants who evaluated the behavior of others did not 
differ by levels of impression management (MHighIM = 5.48, p > .50 vs. MLowIM = 
5.21). However, when participants anticipated how they themselves would behave, 
those who were high rather than low in impression management predicted that they 
would behave more ethically (MHighIM = 4.00 vs. MLowIM = 4.72, p < .01). Including 
impression management as a covariate in a MANCOVA on predicted ethical 
behavior, however, did not reduce the significance of the social and temporal distance 
interaction
4
; in fact, it slightly increased the significance of this interaction (F(1,101) 
= 2.08, p < .04). Hence, this analysis suggests that while impression management is 
significantly correlated with predictions about ones’ own ethical behavior, once this 
relationship has been accounted for, the predicted effects of construal level on ethical 
behavior are slightly strengthened. Overall, my analysis of several aspects related to 
self-presentation concerns--including impression management, suggests that they do 
not account for the key findings I observed on anticipations of ethical behavior. 
 
                                                 
4
 ANCOVAs that included each of the other covariates also failed to reduce the significance 
of the key 2-way interaction between social distance and temporal distance.     
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Discussion 
The results of study 1 suggest that when individuals adopt a higher construal 
level, concerns about the desirability of their ultimate goal are likely to take priority 
and guide their responses, even if the means used to achieve that end state involve 
unethical behavior. On the other hand, when individuals adopt a low construal level, 
attention is devoted to the specific means used and its feasibility. If these means entail 
unethical behavior, individuals who employ a low construal level--particularly those 
whose construal level is low because they themselves are considering engaging in 
these behaviors, will attend to the unethical aspects of the means and thus they are 
likely to eschew the unethical actions.  Experiment 1 supported this view, showing 
that when construal level was higher (i.e., the focal individual was a distal unknown 
other and the event would occur in the far future), participants anticipated greater 
unethical behavior. Yet, when construal was low and particularly strong (i.e., the 
event involved the highly familiar self whose particulars are intimately known), 
participants anticipated low levels of unethical behavior regardless of the event’s 
temporal distance.  
The present study also found that self-presentation concerns alone do not 
appear to account for the predictions that participants rendered about the likelihood of 
(un)ethical behavior. Although higher levels of concern about self-presentation 
(specifically impression management) were associated with significantly lower 
predicted levels of unethical behavior when participants evaluated their own 
behavior, such self-presentation concerns failed to reduce the significant effect of 
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both social and temporal distance that I observed on participants’ predictions of 
ethical behavior.   To the contrary, inclusion of this particular measure of self-
presentation (i.e., impression management) in a model that tested the effects of social 
distance and temporal distance on predicted ethical behavior made the significance of 
the key interaction somewhat stronger.  
In the preceding study, participants’ construal level was varied using two well 
established methods for altering psychological distance: social distance and temporal 
distance.  Yet, one weakness of varying these two factors that influence construal 
level is that doing so requires altering the descriptive content of the messages -- in the 
present case, the content in the scenarios. It would be constructive to show that the 
predicted findings replicate when such alterations in the descriptive content, and any 
potential confounds associated with those alterations, are essentially eliminated. 
Pertinent to this, recent research suggests that changes in construal level may be 
induced in a manner that is independent of the scenario-embedded descriptive 
content. Indeed, some findings by Alter and Oppenheimer (2008) suggest that 
manipulating psychological distance metacognitively could accomplish this. Thus, 
study 2 used this approach. More specifically, I reasoned that manipulating how 
fluently participants read and apprehended the scenarios that described the unethical 
behavior (i.e., the material’s perceptual fluency) could itself alter the magnitude of 
the distance these individuals metacognitively experienced the described event in 
relation to themselves. I expected that the increased (decreased) perceptual fluency a 
reader experiences when apprehending such messages would lessen (enhance) that 
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individual’s perceived psychological distance from the described event and thereby 
prompt him or her to use a low (high) construal level.   In turn, this variation in 
individuals’ construal level should produce responses toward ethically questionable 
events that conceptually replicate those observed in the previous study. 
The purpose of experiment 2 was to investigate this notion that perceptual 
fluency can alter construal level and when this factor is combined with another that 
alters construal level (i.e., social distance), these two factors will elicit outcomes that 
replicate those observed in study 1.  In particular, study 2 varied the perceptual 
fluency of the material in each scenario as well as the same social distance factor (i.e., 
focal individual: self vs. unknown other) that was manipulated in study 1. The 
temporal distance manipulation was dropped.  Further, except for the social distance 
manipulation, which identified the focal individual as either the self or an unknown 
person, the descriptive content presented in the scenarios was constant across 
conditions. 
Study 2 also replaced the self-presentation scales used previously with a 
Public and Private Self-Consciousness Scale (Fenigstein, Scheier and Buss 1975). I 
included this new scale to further explore the role that participants’ self-presentation 
concerns may have had on their predictions of ethical behavior. This scale contains 
items that measure two aspects of self awareness, private and public self-
consciousness, where each gauges different self-presentation concerns. For 
individuals who are high in private self-consciousness, heightened awareness of the 
self and one’s internal thoughts and feelings can result in a denial of objective 
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assessments of his or her own ethical behavior because of how these assessments 
impact self-image. On the other hand, for individuals who are high in public self-
consciousness, a chronic concern for the way others view the self could prompt very 
low predictions of unethical behavior.  Thus, these latter individuals’ chronic concern 
with public self-presentation may result in a habitual need to present oneself in a 
positive light. To summarize, while the underlying motivation may differ for 
participants who are high in either private- or public-self consciousness, the predicted 
effects are the same. Participants who are high in either aspect of self-presentation 
concerns may report that they (i.e., the self) would engage in more ethical behavior. 
 
3.4 EXPERIMENT 2 
Experiment 2 was similar to the previous study except for two important 
modifications. First, the perceptual fluency of the scenario materials was altered by 
varying the size, style, and resolution of the typeface that was employed. All stimulus 
materials were viewed on computer screens that had a white background.  However, 
in the high perceptual fluency condition, the scenarios were presented using a black, 
14-point Tahoma typeface, while in the low fluency condition they were presented 
employing a 50% gray scale, 10-point italicized Comic Sans typeface, which was 
harder to read (Alter et al., 2008).  Second, after responding to the nine scenarios, 
participants completed the Public and Private Self-Consciousness scale (see 
Appendix F).   
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Study 2 was conducted in a computer lab where 112 students completed the 
study in groups ranging from 8 to 20 people.  Participants were seated at computers 
and directed to a URL, which randomly assigned them to treatments. The treatments 
were defined by the study’s 2 (focal individual: self vs. unknown other) by 2 
(perceptual fluency: high vs. low) between subjects factorial design.  The procedure 
was the same as study 1.  Participants read the same nine scenarios and assessed the 
likelihood that the focal individual would behave in an unethical manner. The same 
assessment scales from the previous study were employed.   
 
Results 
A MANOVA on anticipated ethical behavior revealed a significant main 
effect of focal individual (F(1,108) = 32.42, p < .001) and a significant two-way 
interaction of focal individual by perceptual fluency (F(1,108) = 4.17, p < .05) (see 
figure 2). For eight of the nine scenarios, the pattern of means on anticipated 
(un)ethical behavior directionally mimicked the same one that obtained in study 1. 
 
______________________ 
Insert Figure 2 About Here 
______________________ 
 
The key contrasts of this interaction supported the predictions.  Specifically, 
when the focal individual was an unknown distal other (prompting use of a high 
construal level), participants anticipated greater unethical behavior when a low rather 
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than high level of perceptual fluency fostered a sense of greater psychological 
distance (i.e., use of a higher construal level; MLowFluency = 6.59 vs. MHighFluency = 5.92, 
p < .05). But when the focal individual was the extremely familiar self and thereby 
stimulated the use of a strong and extreme low construal level, the perceived 
likelihood of unethical behavior was low and constant, regardless of variation in 
perceptual fluency (p > .50).  
The effect of self-consciousness on predictions of unethical behavior also was 
investigated by regressing predicted unethical behavior onto each of the two scores 
derived from the self-consciousness scale responses (public and private self-
consciousness) as well as the two manipulated factors. No significant effects emerged 
for either private or public self-consciousness (both ps > .50). Further, inclusion of 
these two types of self-consciousness as covariates in a MANCOVA that tested the 
effects of the focal individual and psychological distance on predicted ethical 
behavior revealed a significant interaction effect of these factors (p < .05), but neither 
covariate was significant (both ps > .15). Thus, these findings cast further doubt on 
the view that self-presentation concerns played an essential role in producing the key 
outcomes on predictions of (un)ethical behavior. 
 
Discussion 
The results of study 2 offer further support for the thesis that construal level 
can influence people’s ethical evaluations. When construal level was heightened—in 
this study by means of a meta-cognitive experience that increased psychological 
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distance (i.e., perceptual fluency), assessments of unethical behavior replicated those 
observed in study 1. Specifically, changes in perceptual fluency significantly altered 
predictions of other people’s ethical behaviors, but such changes had no not effect on 
participants’ predictions of their own behavior. Apparently when individuals assessed 
the behavior of others, the increased psychological distance in the low fluency 
condition increased thoughts about the desirability of the described end state; in 
contrast, the high fluency manipulation prompted use of a low construal level (i.e., 
relatively concrete thinking), which increased attention to the specific means used and 
their feasibility. This resulted in predictions of lower levels of unethical actions.  Yet, 
as observed in study 1, an important qualification occurred when the goal directed 
behavior involved the actions of the self. When this was the case (i.e., individuals 
thought about themselves as the actor in each scenario), a lower construal level 
ensued and thus feasibility aspects of the behavior played a greater role in 
participants’ predictions of (un)ethical behavior. Here, participants predicted 
relatively more ethical behavior regardless of the fluency with which the scenarios 
were presented. Notably additional investigation into the effect of the two types of 
self-consciousness (i.e., private and public) that were examined indicated that neither 
played a significant role in producing the preceding effects. 
In each of the studies reported thus far, the degree to which participants 
actually attended to desirability and feasibility aspects of the scenarios was merely 
inferred from the outcomes that were reported; in other words, consideration of these 
aspects was never measured. Study 3 seeks to address this weakness by obtaining 
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evidence of the actual process that underlies the outcomes predicted by my 
hypothesis. Specifically, study 3 aims to demonstrate the mediating role of 
individuals’ consideration of desirability and feasibility aspects of ethical dilemmas 
on the relationship between construal level and assessments of unethical behavior. 
 
3.5 EXPERIMENT 3 
My theorizing contends that variation in construal level affects the roles that 
desirability and feasibility related thoughts exert on predictions of ethical behavior. 
Moreover, while psychological distance represents one way of influencing construal 
level, the outcomes on anticipated ethical behavior that I predict based on construal 
level theory should hold for any manipulation of construal level. Thus, in study 3, in 
addition to using the same social distance (construal level) manipulation employed in 
the previous two studies (i.e., the focal person in each scenario was identified as 
either the self or an unknown person), I replaced the perceptual fluency manipulation 
with a construal level priming task patterned after one developed by Fujita, et al., 
(2006). Participants completed this construal level priming task prior to responding to 
three ethical scenarios that were taken from studies 1 and 2. Hence, the design of 
experiment 3 was a 2 (construal level priming task: low vs. high) by 2 (focal person: 
self or unknown other) between subjects factorial. 
A second important modification made in study 3 was that after participants 
reported their responses about the focal individual’s anticipated behavior in each of 
the three scenarios, they were asked to report all thoughts they had as they considered 
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that scenario. These thoughts were coded for whether they concerned either 
desirability or feasibility aspects of the scenarios, thereby serving as indicators of the 
importance participants assigned to each of these factors as they evaluated the 
scenarios.   
Participants consisted of 276 undergraduates who completed the study in 
exchange for course credit. All took part in the study in small groups of up to 16 
people and were seated at computers where they were directed to a URL that 
randomly assigned them to treatments. To begin, participants performed a construal 
level priming task (Fujita et al., 2006) that encouraged them to think at either a high 
or low construal level. The task entailed presenting individuals with a list of items, 
and for each, they were asked to identify either a superordinate category that the item 
exemplified (e.g., chocolate bar – junk food) or a subordinate level instance that 
exemplified the item (e.g., chocolate bar - Kit Kat). The logic underlying this task is 
that categorizing items at a superordinate level prompts a high construal level or 
relatively abstract thinking, whereas exemplifying items at a subordinate level fosters 
a relatively low level construal or concrete thinking. All participants received the 
same list of 26 items (e.g., king, singer, painting, soap opera). In the high construal 
level condition, participants responded to each item by answering the question, “___ 
is an example of what?” In the low construal level condition, they used the same 
items to answer the question, “An example of ___ is what?” Two sample items and 
responses were provided to ensure that participants understood their task.  
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After responding to the construal level priming task, participants were 
presented with three ethical scenarios in random order (see Appendix G).  In each, the 
protagonist’s social distance from the self was varied, thereby altering construal level 
in a second way (i.e., the protagonist was either the self or a distal unknown other).  
Immediately after responding to each scenario, participants completed a thought-
listing task in which they recorded all feelings, thoughts and opinions that went 
through their minds as they reflected on the preceding scenario. Instructions 
underscored that participants were to avoid reporting any new thoughts that they had 
not considered earlier (see Appendix H). 
Two trained judges who were blind to the conditions coded all thoughts for 
whether they concerned either desirability or feasibility aspects of the scenario. 
Thoughts were classified as desirability focused if they discussed either a positive or 
negative end state that could be attained (e.g., gaining favor with the boss, losing 
one’s job, being promoted, etc.).  They were classified as feasibility focused if they 
discussed the specific actions or behaviors that the protagonist would enact (e.g., he 
or she would perform the requested actions, but not actually do the unethical deed,  
would report the unethical request to a supervisor, would only partially comply with 
the request, etc.). Thought classifications of the two coders were reasonably 
correlated (r = .73) and were averaged to obtain a score for each response type. 
 
Results 
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A MANOVA on anticipated (un)ethical behavior in response to the three 
scenarios revealed results that aligned with those of the previous two studies. A main 
effect of focal individual emerged (F(1,270) = 44.89, p < .001), but it was qualified 
by an interaction of construal level prime and focal individual (F(1,270) = 5.91, p < 
.05). Planned comparisons supported the predictions. Specifically, when the focal 
individual was an unknown distal other (inducing a high construal level), participants 
anticipated greater unethical behavior when a higher, rather than a lower construal 
level was primed (MHighCL = 5.54 vs. MLowCL = 5.02; p < .05). But when the focal 
individual was the self, which prompted an extremely low construal level, anticipated 
unethical behavior was low and constant, regardless of the primed construal level (p > 
.25). 
 
Investigating the Mediating Roles of Desirability and Feasibility 
To assess the role that consideration of desirability and feasibility related 
aspects of the scenarios played in shaping how participants’ expected the protagonist 
(i.e., the self or an unknown other) to behave, mediation analyses were conducted. To 
perform such analysis, separate indices of participants’ desirability and feasibility 
related thoughts about the scenarios were created by summing the number of 
cognitions that participants produced of each type. My theorizing contends that 
desirability (feasibility) concerns should dominate and thereby heighten (reduce) 
expectations that the protagonist will behave unethically when conditions lead 
participants to think about the scenarios using predominately higher (lower) construal 
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level thinking.  Thus, when participants consider the behavior of an unknown person 
after completing a priming task that fosters a high versus low construal level, they 
should generate a higher (lower) level of desirability (feasibility) related thoughts. 
This follows because both the unknown distal target person and the high construal 
level priming task should incite higher construal level thinking. On the other hand, 
because contemplation of the self is thought to induce an especially low construal 
level, thoughts about feasibility related matters should be particularly relevant when 
the self is the target, and this should occur regardless of the construal level fostered 
by the priming task.  
I expect that desirability related cognitions will have an overall mediating 
impact on how construal level affects anticipated ethical behavior. This expectation is 
based on a view expressed in the extant literature, namely that before people consider 
engaging in any goal directed behavior, they first try to ascertain that the behavior 
attains some threshold level of desirability. Only after this threshold has been met do 
feasibility related concerns become germane; I investigate this aspect of my 
hypothesis below in a series of regression analyses. In addition to the just discussed 
mediating role of desirability, the preceding discussion about the types of thoughts 
that people should elicit when they consider the behavior of an unknown person 
versus the self also suggests that the social distance factor (i.e., whether the 
protagonist is an unknown distal other or the self) will moderate the mediating impact 
of desirability cognitions.  
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To explore this latter thesis, I first conducted a test of mediated moderation. 
Based on the method outlined by Muller, Judd and Yzerbyt (2005), responses to all 
three scenarios were averaged to produce a single indicator of anticipated (un)ethical 
behavior (i.e., the dependent variable). Likewise, the desirability and feasibility 
indices for the three scenarios were averaged to produce a single mediating indicator 
for each type of thought. Evidence of mediated moderation was tested using three 
5,000 bootstrapped models (Muller et al., 2005).  In the first model, anticipated 
ethical behavior was regressed on construal level, social distance (the moderator in 
this model) and an interaction of these two terms. Consistent with the MANOVA 
results reported earlier, the interaction term was significant, indicating that the 
interaction of construal level prime and social distance significantly predicted 
anticipated ethical behavior (β = -.77, p < .05). In the second model, construal level, 
social distance and the interaction term were found to significantly predict the 
mediator, desirability related thoughts (β = -.86, p < .01). Finally, in a third equation, 
anticipated ethical behavior was regressed on construal level, social distance, the 
number of desirability related thoughts, the interaction of construal level and social 
distance, and the interaction of the mediator (desirability related thoughts) and the 
moderator (social distance). The results revealed evidence of mediated moderation. 
Specifically, while the interaction term involving the mediator and moderator was 
significant (β = .49, p <.01), the interaction term between construal level and social 
distance was reduced and was no longer significant (β = -.37, p > .05). This last 
finding provides evidence for the role that is played by the interaction of thoughts of 
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desirability and social distance on predictions of ethical behaviors. It also supports the 
role of social distance (evaluating the self or an unknown other) as a moderating 
factor on predictions of ethical behavior. 
While this evidence of mediated moderation represents an important test of 
my hypothesis, a second aspect of my hypothesis was that feasibility related thoughts 
should play a particularly important role when individuals rely on a lower construal 
level, such as when participants evaluate their own behavior. This contention is based 
on prior literature. Along these lines, Sagristano, Trope and Liberman (2002) suggest 
that consideration of feasibility related aspects become important once a desirability 
threshold is met. These researchers suggest that feasibility concerns are likely to be 
particularly important when  relatively lower construal level thinking prevails; this 
should occur in the proximate social distance condition (i.e., when the protagonist is 
the self). Together, these previous findings suggest that after accounting for the 
effects of desirability related thoughts, feasibility related thoughts should effectively 
mediate the effects of construal level. To test this thesis, I created a combined 
indicator of both desirability and feasibility related thoughts by subtracting the 
number of desirability related thoughts from the number of feasibility related 
thoughts. This combined measure of both types of thoughts was then subjected to a 
test of mediation. 
Using the bootstrapping technique advocated by Preacher and Hayes (2008; 
Zhao, Lynch and Chen 2010), the results of a 5,000 bootstrapped sample provided 
evidence for a significant relationship between the interaction of construal level 
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prime, social distance, and the mediator (i.e., the difference between the number of 
feasibility and desirability related thoughts; β = .847, p < .01). More importantly, the 
analysis revealed that after controlling for this indirect effect (i.e., the mediator), no 
additional direct effect of construal level and social distance on predicted ethical 
behavior remained (β = -.254, p > .40). These results support my thesis that the 
quantity of feasibility less desirability related thoughts significantly mediates the 
interaction effect of construal level and social distance on predictions of ethical 
behavior (95% CI [-.69 to -.23]). 
The preceding mediation analyses produced results that support my 
theorizing. Specifically, the interaction effect of the construal level prime and social 
distance on anticipated unethical behavior could only be fully mediated when 
desirability and feasibility related thoughts were both taken into account. To 
investigate the role of the two types of cognitions (desirability and feasibility) more 
directly, an ANOVA was conducted on the measure of feasibility less desirability 
related thoughts (i.e., the relative number of feasibility related thoughts). The results 
closely resemble those of the key dependent variable, predicted unethical behavior 
(figure 3). A significant interaction of construal level prime and social distance 
emerged (F(1,265) = 12.86, p < .01). Planned comparisons also revealed outcomes 
that align with my hypothesis. Specifically, while the difference between the number 
of feasibility and desirability related thoughts did not vary significantly for 
participants who predicted their own behavior (i.e., the relative magnitude of 
feasibility thoughts was quite high; MHighCL = .75 vs. MLowCL = .91, p > .30), 
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participants who evaluated the behavior of unknown others reported a higher relative 
magnitude of feasibility related thoughts when their construal level was low versus 
high (MHighCL = -.61 vs. MLowCL =.40, p < .01). 
______________________ 
Insert Figure 3 About Here 
______________________ 
 
Discussion 
In sum, the results of study 3 significantly add to my prior findings. First, they 
provide additional support for the pivotal impact of construal level on anticipated 
ethical behavior, and they do so by using a different manipulation of construal level 
(i.e., a construal level priming task). Second, the results contribute to the literature by 
offering compelling evidence for the underlying roles of desirability and feasibility 
related thoughts on anticipated ethical behavior. While previous studies of construal 
level theory have suggested that important roles are played by desirability and 
feasibility related thoughts, such evidence has been based on inferences drawn from 
findings as opposed to genuine empirical evidence (e.g., Liberman et al., 1988; 
Freitas et al., 2001; Sagristano et al., (2002) seems to offer an exception, yet their 
support rests on correlational evidence). Study 3 included actual measurements of the 
numbers of desirability and feasibility thoughts that people generated following 
variations in social distance and construal level prime. This enabled me to shed 
valuable light on the observed roles that these two types of cognitions play in 
determining unethical behavior. Third, experiment 3 provided the first empirical 
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evidence that supports the asymmetric relationship between desirability and 
feasibility, a phenomenon that has been only proposed by researchers. Specifically, 
my research revealed that while desirability considerations were important for all 
participants, regardless of the construal level that was primed or the actor that was 
evaluated (i.e., the self or an unknown other), feasibility related considerations 
became very important when a low construal level was elicited through a priming 
task and when participants considered their own behavior. Evidence for this 
asymmetric role of desirability and feasibility was provided by two series of 
regression analyses. In the first of these, a test of mediated moderation by desirability 
provided initial evidence for the important role that is played by desirability related 
cognitions and the moderating effect of consideration of the self, as a result of its 
particularly strong instantiation of low psychological distance. A second series of 
regressions that evaluated the mediating role of the relative number of feasibility and 
desirability related thoughts provided additional insight into the moderating role of 
the self. The results of those tests of mediation revealed that feasibility related 
thoughts were significantly elevated when participants made predictions about their 
own behavior. In particular, participants who made predictions about their own 
behavior produced more feasibility related thoughts than desirability related thoughts 
(Feas - Des = .83); when participants evaluated the behavior of an unknown other, 
however, desirability related cognitions were more slightly more prominent (Feas – 
Des = - .10).  
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Follow-up analyses also investigated the relationship between construal level 
and, separately, the number of desirability and feasibility related thoughts. The results 
confirmed that feasibility related thoughts were significantly greater when 
participants relied on a lower construal level, regardless of whether they were making 
predictions about their own behavior (MHighCL = 2.05 vs. MLowCL = 2.36, p < .05) or 
that of an unknown (distal) other (MHighCL = 0.79 vs. MLowCL = 1.38, p < .05). 
Desirability related thoughts, however, did not differ for participants who made 
predictions about their own behavior (p>.20). Among participants who made 
predictions about the behavior of others, however, desirability related thoughts were 
significantly greater when participants relied on a higher construal level (MHighCL = 
1.39 vs. MLowCL = 0.98, p < .01). 
 The three studies I have reported to this point provide strong evidence of how 
changes in construal level affect anticipated ethical behavior. Yet, these studies are 
not without certain weaknesses. One is that they always assessed how ethically 
individuals anticipated that particular actors -- either the self or an unknown other -- 
would behave in response to situations that were clearly hypothetical and never 
actually took place. Second, while the studies found that variation in construal level 
reliably affected how ethically individuals felt that unknown other people would 
behave, variation in construal level never altered individuals’ anticipation about how 
they themselves would behave. Quite consistently, when asked to anticipate their own 
behavior, individuals maintained that they would behave ethically. This latter 
observation seems curious and is hard to reconcile with considerable real world 
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evidence, which indicates that individuals frequently behave unethically, especially 
when the end state goal that spawns the unethical action has highly desirable 
consequences for the self.  
What might explain this apparent anomaly? I suggest that hypothetical 
scenarios, such as those used in the three studies I have reported to this point, require 
individuals to engage in concentrated attention to the self as they directly imagine and 
envision themselves as the actor, and this mental activity prompts them to focus 
explicitly on the self as a salient object when they assess their own likely behavior. 
This exercise in focusing on and imagining how the self would behave differs 
considerably from the phenomenal experience people have in real life situations. In 
real life contexts where people must decide how they will behave, consideration of 
the self as the actor is much less salient. Indeed, thoughts about the self tend to fade 
into the background because people devote their attention to factors ranging from 
their goal, the behavior(s) they might pursue, and any obstacles that could stand in the 
way. This distinction between attention paid to the self in hypothetical scenarios 
versus real life situations is likely to be consequential because the dedicated and 
explicit attention that people give to the self in hypothetical scenarios reduces 
psychological distance and thereby magnifies low construal level thinking even more 
than my theory would propose. In turn, this substantially magnified low construal 
level thinking prompts and markedly increases the influence of feasibility related 
thoughts, causing these thoughts to prevail despite manipulations that otherwise 
would be likely to increase individuals’ construal level.  
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The next two studies seek to address these weaknesses. In them, individuals 
are not given hypothetical scenarios nor are they asked to simply imagine and 
anticipate how either they or an unknown person would behave. Instead, they perform 
in real time an actual task that provides them an opportunity to engage in 
dishonorable or unethical behavior; if they engage in such behavior, they can earn and 
enjoy a higher level of financial compensation than they will if they behave 
honorably. Importantly, because participants must attend in real time to the matters at 
hand (i.e., gain an understanding of their task and actually perform it), they are 
unlikely to focus their attention explicitly on the self.  Hence, in this more real life 
context, I hypothesize that the self will be less salient and thus participants will 
indeed be sensitive to and affected by a construal level prime that they complete 
before they perform the target task.  Accordingly, I predict that in study 4, 
participants will behave less ethically on the target task when prior to performing it 
they receive a high versus low level construal priming task. This should occur 
because, as I have theorized and as my prior studies found, priming people to use a 
higher construal level should increase consideration of desirability (yet not feasibility) 
related thoughts, which encourage less honorable or more unethical behavior.  
Finally, while study 5 aims to replicate study 4, it also investigates the logic I 
have proposed, which is that the impact of construal level on ethical behavior hinges 
on whether individuals’ attention to the self is either peripheral (i.e., minimal) or 
explicit. In my last study (experiment 5), participants follow the same procedure and 
respond to the same tasks and measures as they do in study 4, except that half of the 
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participants are given an additional task that should heighten the salience of and thus 
prompt individuals to devote explicit attention to the self. Hence, this latter task is 
expected to induce a phenomenal experience more similar to the one represented in 
my earlier studies (i.e., those that employed hypothetical scenarios) where individuals 
were likely to explicitly attend to and focus on the self. I expect that inclusion of this 
high self salience task should reduce psychological distance and thereby increase the 
relative importance of feasibility related concerns. As a result, I predict that when 
participants complete the additional high self salience task and therefore became 
more explicitly aware of the self, variation in construal level will not significantly 
influence how honestly or ethically participants behave on the critical perceptual 
abilities task. On the other hand, when the self is not rendered salient, a high versus 
low construal level will produce more dishonorable (unethical) behavior on the 
perceptual task. 
 
3.6 EXPERIMENT 4 
In study 4 I examined individuals’ real world ethical behavior, investigating 
whether they would “cheat” and behave dishonorably on a perceptual task that 
determined their financial compensation. Seventy nine participants were recruited 
from a pool at a large Midwestern university in return for financial compensation. 
Participants completed the study in small groups of up to 16 people. Each participant 
was seated at a computer and informed that (s)he would be participating in two tasks, 
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first a general knowledge task and then a task designed to assess their perceptual 
abilities. 
The general knowledge task was the same construal level categorization task 
used in study 3. Half of the participants were given 26 items and randomly assigned 
to identify appropriate superordinate level responses, which prompted higher 
construal level thinking; the remaining participants received the same items but were 
asked to exemplify each of the items at the subordinate level, thereby stimulating the 
use of lower construal level thinking. After completing this first task, participants 
were instructed to open a file on their computer labeled “perceptual abilities task.” 
This launched the crucial task that provided participants an opportunity to cheat. 
In this perceptual task, participants saw a square in the center of the screen 
that was divided into two halves by a diagonal line (Figure 4). Twenty dots appeared 
on either side of or on the line. Participants’ task was to quickly assess whether they 
felt that more of the dots were on either the left or the right side of the diagonal line. 
Participants were instructed to use the keyboard to indicate their assessment, pressing 
“m” for the right side or “z” for the left side. 
______________________ 
Insert Figure 4 About Here 
______________________ 
 
Before beginning this task, participants were given a sample square. They 
were told that in this study they would see each square of a series for only one 
second, and they were to indicate as accurately yet as quickly as possible whether 
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they perceived that more of the dots were on the left or right side of the diagonal line. 
Next, participants were given the rules that governed their compensation for their task 
performance, after which they were asked to practice performing the task by 
responding to 200 trials (the same number as in the actual paid task).  
The instructions that explained task performance compensation were adapted 
from ones used by Gino and Ariely (2010). Participants read that: “because most 
people can more easily estimate the number of dots on the left side, you will be paid 
.5 cent (1/2 cent) for each trial where you respond that there are more dots on the left 
side, and 5 cents for each trial where you respond that there are more dots on the right 
side.” Thus, this payment structure provided participants with an incentive to blindly 
report that there were more dots on the right side on each trial, particularly on trials 
where the dot placement made the correct answer rather ambiguous.
5
 As such, 
participants were presented with a conflict between performing the task in the manner 
actually requested (to base responses on their perceptions of the actual stimuli; a 
lower construal level, feasibility focused criterion) or to simply indicate that more 
dots appeared on the right, which would maximize their personal earnings (a higher-
level, desirability focused criterion). 
After participants received the preceding information and completed the 
practice trials, they performed 200 actual trials for which they would be compensated. 
Upon completing these trials, the administrator entered their data into the survey and 
                                                 
5
 For 100 trials, the correct response was unambiguous, indicating that more dots were on the 
right in 50 trials and on the left in another 50 trials. For the other 100 trials, the dots were 
arranged such that the correct response was designed to be relatively ambiguous. 
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recorded the amount that the participant would be paid a bit later. Next, participants 
were directed to complete the rest of the study by answering some questions about the 
task and themselves. These questions included some measures that could serve as 
potential covariates (e.g., Self Control, Tangney, Baumeister and Boone 2004; 
Conscientiousness, BFAS subscale; DeYoung, Quilty and Peterson 2007; and two 
others that explored a possible rival explanation. Specifically, participants may have 
found it easier to complete the perceptual (i.e., spatial) task when they were induced 
by the priming task to employ a higher construal level. This follows because 
processing at a higher construal level incites more abstract or global thinking (e.g., 
Liberman et al., 2009), which has been equated with the use of a higher construal 
level (Smith, Wigboldus and Dijksterhuis 2008). Moreover, using such processing is 
known to enhance performance on rapid response spatial exercises, like this study’s 
perceptual task (Navon 1977). Indeed, if this occurred in this study and the increase in 
perceived ease was substantial, it could have demotivated these participants from 
performing the perceptual task accurately. That is, such participants may have 
resented being required to perform repeated trials of such a easy task, and they may 
have expressed this sentiment by behaving dishonorably (i.e., unilaterally reporting 
that more dots appeared on the right side of the diagonals, thereby maximizing their 
personal compensation). In contrast, participants who received the low construal level 
prime would not have experienced this sense of ease and its demotivating influence as 
they performed the perceptual task. So presumably these participants performed the 
perceptual task largely as intended and consequently behaved more honorably. To 
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assess this rival explanation, participants were asked to rate on 7 point scales both 
how easy (easy, challenging) and how engaging (engaging, interesting, involving, 
enjoyable, tedious, boring) they found the perceptual task.   
 
Results 
If participants completed the perceptual task in the manner they were 
instructed (i.e., indicating their honest perceptions) and they responded with perfect 
accuracy, they would have earned a maximum of $6.50 in compensation. Actual 
performance data indicated that on average, participants earned more than this 
amount - a mean sum of $7.31, indicating that they behaved somewhat dishonorably.
6
  
More critically, however, the construal level manipulation influenced how likely 
participants were to disregard the instructions, behave dishonorably, and report 
responses on the task that elevated their earnings. As predicted, participants who 
received the high versus low construal level  priming task prior to performing  the 
perceptual task behaved significantly less honestly (i.e., earned significantly more in 
compensation; MHiConstrual = $8.09 vs. MLoConstrual = $6.41, p < .01).  
Next, I explored the plausibility of the rival explanation discussed earlier by 
examining participants’ ratings of how easy and engaging they found the perceptual 
task. Principal components factor analysis of the eight rating items revealed a two 
factor solution. The first factor was comprised of the six items that pertained to how 
                                                 
6
 Given the imbalanced nature of the compensation structure and the number of trials in this 
task, participants could have earned a maximum of $10 if they always indicated that there 
were more dots on the right side of the square. 
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engaging the task was, and it accounted for 60.67% of the variance (Eigenvalue = 
4.85). The second factor consisted of the two items concerning how easy the task 
was, which accounted for an additional 16.68% of the variance (Eigenvalue = 1.34). 
The items comprising each factor were averaged separately, resulting in a task 
engagement (α = .93) and a task ease (r = .70) index.  An ANCOVA that included the 
engagement index as a covariate revealed that the index did not significantly affect 
perceptual task performance (p > .50). The same was true for the task ease index (p > 
.50). Further, in neither ANCOVA did the covariate reduce the effect of construal 
level on payment (both ps < .01)
7
.  
In addition, while a regression showed that Conscientiousness had no 
significant effect on task performance (β = 59.18, p > .15), the measure that gauged 
Self-Control did exert an influence on task performance (β = 60.55, p < .05). To 
investigate this effect, a spotlight analysis was conducted at plus and minus one 
standard deviation from the mean level of Self-Control. The results confirmed a 
simple main effect of Self -Control. Specifically, participants with higher levels of 
Self-Control earned less money than those with a lower level (MLowSC = $6.88 vs. 
MHighSC = $7.71, p < .01). Inclusion of Self-Control in a one-way ANCOVA however, 
did not reduce the significance of the effects of the construal level prime on 
participants’ level of financial compensation.  
 
                                                 
7
 Separate ANOVAs also revealed that construal level had no effect on either perceived task 
ease or engagement (both ps > .10).   
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Discussion 
The results of study 4 offer some insight into an important apparent 
inconsistency. Specifically, despite abundant evidence supporting the notion that in 
real world situations individuals often act dishonestly, in all three of my previous 
studies that involved hypothetical situations, participants predicted that they 
themselves would engage in low levels of unethical behavior, and this occurred 
regardless of their construal level. I posited that this inconsistency between behavior 
in real life situations and my studies stems from the exceptionally close psychological 
distance that participants feel when they devote direct and concentrated attention to 
the self. Participants presumably devoted this directed attention to the self in my first 
three studies because the hypothetical scenarios that they received in fact invited this 
strong focus on the self as the actor. As the results of study 3 illustrated, this 
exceptional reduction in psychological distance magnified low construal level 
thinking so greatly that feasibility related thoughts prevailed despite the increase in 
construal level that might result from the priming task that participants completed. In 
study 4, however, participants faced an actual dilemma. Due to the real life nature of 
the situation, attention to the self was meager because participants instead devoted 
most of their attention to a number of task relevant issues (e.g., the instructions, their 
underlying goals, obstacles, etc.). As a result, the significantly lower salience of the 
self, which is characteristic of real (i.e., not hypothetical) situations, allowed variation 
in construal level to have the predicted effect on (un)ethical behavior. Specifically, I 
proposed that people who were exposed to a high versus a low construal level prime 
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would assign greater value to highly desirable personal rewards than to the dishonest 
means required to achieve those rewards. As a result, I expected individuals who 
were primed to engage in a higher construal level to act less honorably (i.e., more 
unethically or dishonestly), prompting behavior that would earn them greater 
financial compensation. The findings of this study upheld this prediction. This 
observation is informative not only for what it tells us about when people will act 
unethically (i.e., their sensitivity to variation in construal level). It is also informative 
because it reveals outcomes that contrast with those observed in my prior studies, 
which never assessed people’s actual behavior but instead asked them to simply 
anticipate how they would behave in an ethically challenging hypothetical situation. 
Hence, in contrast to the predictions made by participants in the previous three 
studies, in study 4, a higher (lower) construal level was expected and found to 
increase (reduce) the use of dishonest behavior among participants themselves. My 
logic for why this should occur was based on the expectation that a reduction in 
attention to the self (which occurs when people encounter a real, not hypothetical, 
ethics-related dilemma) would enable variation in construal level to influence the 
number of desirability and feasibility related thoughts that participants had with 
respect to the task at hand. This distinction between attention paid to the self in 
hypothetical scenarios versus in real life situations is likely to be consequential 
because the dedicated and explicit attention that people devote to the self in 
hypothetical scenarios reduces psychological distance and thereby magnifies low 
construal level thinking even more than my theory would propose. In turn, this 
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substantially magnified low construal level thinking prompts and markedly increases 
the generation and influence of feasibility related thoughts, causing these thoughts to 
prevail despite manipulations that otherwise would be likely to increase individuals’ 
construal level. 
According to this explanation, any activity that increases attention to the self 
should significantly mitigate the effects of a construal level prime on dishonest 
behavior, because self focused attentional activity reduces psychological distance and 
increases the prevalence of lower-construal level, feasibility related thinking. In study 
5, I test this proposition by administering to half of the participants a task that 
increases thought about the self just prior to asking them to perform the same 
perceptual task used in study 4. This latter task presents participants with an 
opportunity to behave dishonestly. Based on my theorizing, I expect that among 
participants for whom the self is not made salient, variation in construal level will 
prompt outcomes that replicate those observed in study 4 -- a higher (lower) construal 
level will result in more (less) dishonest behavior. However, among participants 
where the self is made salient (and thus the relative magnitude of feasibility related 
concerns is greatly heightened), variation in construal level should not affect their 
behavior; instead, these individuals should consistently behave quite honorably and 
ethically. 
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3.7 EXPERIMENT 5 
Experiment 5 was similar to the previous study except for one important 
modification. As before, participants began by completing the same construal level 
categorization task that required them to identify 26 items at either a superordinate 
(high construal) or a subordinate (low construal) level. However, prior to performing 
the critical perceptual task, all participants completed a word search task that has been 
used in self construal research to vary attention to the self (Davis and Brock 1975; 
Kuhnen and Oyserman 2002). In one version of this task that represents the self 
salient condition, participants were asked to circle all pronouns (e.g., words like “I” 
and “me”) that appeared in a short paragraph. In a second version, which comprised 
the low self salience condition, they circled all articles (e.g., words like “a” and “the”) 
in a paragraph. The latter paragraph contained no pronouns. As explained later, I 
administered the word search task twice to each participant, each time employing a 
different paragraph. Care was taken to ensure that the length of the paragraphs in both 
conditions were comparable (Appendix I). Thus, all participants were randomly 
assigned to one of four conditions of the study’s 2 (construal level: high vs. low) by 2 
(salience of the self: high vs. low) between subjects factorial design. 
Eight-six participants who were part of a subject pool at a large university 
were recruited in exchange for financial compensation. Each participant was seated at 
a computer and informed that (s)he would be completing several tasks. The first was 
the so called general knowledge task employed in study 4 that used item 
categorization to vary participants’ construal level. Next, participants completed the 
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first word search task, which was described as a “mind refreshing exercise.” This 
task, which involved searching for either all pronouns or articles in a paragraph, 
varied whether the salience of the self was high or low, respectively. At this point, a 
file labeled “perceptual abilities task” was launched on participants’ computers, and 
participants read the same instructions for the perceptual task that were used in 
experiment 4. In brief, they were told that they would be given a series of squares that 
were divided into halves by a diagonal line, and 20 dots would appear on either side 
of or on the diagonal line. Their task was to identify and report as quickly and 
accurately as possible whether they perceived that there were more dots on either the 
right or left side of the line. Following this, participants were informed how their 
performance compensation on the task would be determined. Like study 4, it was 
structured such that participants faced a conflict between completing the task as 
instructed (i.e., as accurately as possible) or using a strategy that was dishonest but 
served a self-serving purpose by elevating the amount of money they would earn.  
Participants then performed a series of practice trials of the task. 
After the practice trials, participants were directed to complete the second 
word search task (again purportedly to refresh their minds) before embarking on the 
actual perception task trials. This word search task consisted of the same exercise 
they completed earlier that manipulated the salience of the self, but it was performed 
on a different paragraph. All participants were assigned to the same self salience 
condition as they were in the earlier word search task. Following this, participants 
performed the 200 trials of the actual perception task for which they would be 
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compensated. After finishing these trials, the administrator entered participants’ data 
into the survey and recorded the amount that they earned and would be paid. Finally, 
participants answered the same scales assessed in study 4 (i.e., task ease and 
enjoyment; Self Control (Tangney et al., 2004), and Conscientiousness (DeYoung et 
al., 2007). These served as potential covariates. Participants were then paid and 
dismissed. 
 
Results  
An ANOVA run on participants’ earned financial compensation revealed a 
significant main effect of construal level (F(1,72) = 5.31, p < .05), which was 
qualified by a significant two-way interaction of construal level and self salience 
(F(1,72) = 7.70, p < .01; Figure 5). The results of this interaction generally aligned 
with the predictions. Specifically, planned comparisons revealed that when the 
salience of (i.e., attention to) the self was low, the outcomes replicated those of study 
4. That is, participants who received a prime that prompted use of a high versus low 
construal level behaved less honorably and thereby earned more money on the 
perceptual task (F(1,72) = 12.26, p < .001; MHiConstrual = $7.85 vs. MLoConstrual = $5.90; 
p < .01). However, when the salience of (i.e., attention to) the self was relatively high, 
construal level had no effect on how honestly participants performed the perceptual 
task or their earned compensation. Here, compensation sums were moderately low 
and constant, implying that when the self was salient, participants performed the task 
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in a reasonably honest manner (although perhaps not entirely; F(1,72) = 0.117, p > 
.73; MHiConstrual = $6.84 vs. MLoConstrual = $7.02; p > .70).  
______________________ 
Insert Figure 5 About Here 
______________________ 
An investigation of the potential covariates revealed that only 
Conscientiousness was significantly related to the effects of construal level and self 
salience. While an ANCOVA that included conscientiousness did not change the 
significance of the 2-way interaction of construal level and attention to self (F(1,70) = 
7.92, p < .01), a mixed model regression did reveal a significant 3-way interaction of 
construal level, self salience, and conscientiousness (F(1,62) = 6.07, p < .05) (Figure 
6).  To investigate this interaction, a spotlight analysis was conducted at plus and 
minus one standard deviation from the mean level of conscientiousness. The results 
showed that the performance of only participants who were low in conscientiousness 
displayed the 2-way interaction of construal level and self salience; participants who 
were high in conscientiousness exhibited no effect of construal level, self salience, or 
an interaction (all ps > .23). Although such findings are not relevant to my theorizing, 
they might be expected given that individuals who are low, but not high, in 
conscientiousness should be less inclined to perform the perceptual task precisely as 
they were instructed.  
______________________ 
Insert Figure 6 About Here 
______________________ 
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Discussion 
Study 5 addressed two important issues. First, employing a context that 
involved actual (not hypothetical) behavior, this study found that the outcomes 
observed in experiment 4 replicated. In other words, as is commonly experienced in 
real world situations where attentiveness to the self fades into the background, when 
individuals employ a high versus low construal level, they behave more dishonestly. 
The second and more informative issue that this study addressed involved identifying 
precisely why the preceding outcome occurred in studies 4 and 5, but it failed to 
occur in my prior three studies. Study 5 established that a key factor that distinguishes 
between hypothetical situations (like those used in my initial three studies) and real 
ones (like those employed in studies 4 and 5) is whether individuals explicitly 
envision and attend to themselves as the actor, or instead their thoughts about the self 
as actor fade into the periphery as other more pressing considerations command more 
attention (i.e., considerations such as comprehension of the task, the stimuli that are 
present, their goals, etc.). When the self is highly salient and thus people direct 
explicit attention to oneself (i.e., an individual considers a hypothetical scenario with 
the self as the actor, or the salience of the self is otherwise heightened as in study 5), 
psychological distance is greatly diminished and thoughts about feasibility related 
matters magnify substantially. In situations of this sort, variation in construal level is 
apt to be overpowered, rendering it too weak to exert an appreciable influence; 
instead individuals are likely to dwell on feasibility considerations, which motivate 
them to behave quite honestly and do so reliably. In contrast, when attentiveness to 
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the self is low, the imbalance just described should be absent. Hence, in situations of 
this type, the impact of construal level is likely to be felt. Indeed, study 5 bore out the 
preceding logic, revealing that variation in construal level predictably affected how 
honorably individuals behaved when the salience of the self was low, but it had no 
effect when salience of the self was high.  
Although the findings of study 5 generally support my hypotheses, one 
observation did not fully align with expectations. Recall that in my first three studies, 
when salience of the self was high due to the use of hypothetical scenarios that 
invoked explicit attention to the self, participants indicated consistently that they 
would behave in a relatively honorable and ethical manner.  Also, when a low 
construal level was elicited, the predictions participants made about the behavior of 
unknown others did not differ from the relatively ethical behavior that was predicted 
of the self.  Yet, in study 5 when a low construal level was induced and the self was 
not salient (i.e., due to completion of the article circling task), participants behaved 
significantly more honestly than those for whom the self was salient (i.e., those who 
completed the pronoun circling task).  Of course, I can only speculate about why 
individuals in the low construal level/low self salience condition of study 5 behaved 
more honorably than participants for whom construal level was low but the self was 
salient. Nevertheless, I suspect that this unexpected finding occurred because the 
article circling task that the former individuals performed inadvertently prompted 
them to use a low construal level, thereby reinforcing or perhaps even doubling the 
inducement for them to employ such a construal level that the earlier introduced low 
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construal level manipulation had already encouraged these individuals to use.  This 
seems plausible because the article circling task required participants to attend to 
particularly low level details or items (i.e., readily overlooked and seemingly 
meaningless words such as “the” or “a”) in a short paragraph. Relatedly, extant 
research has shown that attending to such low level, specific features of a stimulus is 
associated with the use of low construal level thinking (Wakslak, et al., 2006).  
Hence, the preceding suggests that the article circling task may have reaffirmed or 
intensified an emphasis on feasibility that already was induced in low self salience 
participants who previously had received a manipulation that fostered a low construal 
level.  Note that in contrast, for low self salience participants who received a high 
(versus a low) construal level manipulation before performing the perceptual task, the 
reduction in construal level presumably prompted by the article circling task exerted 
no appreciable discernible impact on their attention to feasibility aspects of the task. 
This may have ensued because these individuals were primed at the onset of the study 
to employ a high construal level, which presumably took precedence.  Undoubtedly, 
future research is needed to assess the viability of this possible explanation.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
101 
 
Chapter Four 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
4.1 SUMMARY OF RESULTS 
Together, the results from the five studies I have reported provide converging 
evidence for the effects of construal level on ethical behavior. In addition, they shed 
light on the mediating roles that the desirability and feasibility of events play in 
producing this effect. In the first three studies, such evidence was provided using 
hypothetical scenarios where respondents rendered predictions about the behavior of 
a person who encountered an ethical dilemma. In the final two studies, participants’ 
actual dishonest behavior was assessed to offer evidence of whether construal level 
can affect ethical behavior in real life situations. 
I developed my predictions based on evidence which shows that variation in 
construal level can prompt people to differentially attend to, emphasize, and make 
dominant use of two aspects of goal-derived behavior -- desirability and feasibility 
concerns (Eyal et al., 2009). Specifically, prior research has shown that a high (low) 
construal level causes individuals to attach greater importance to and/or be more 
influenced by the desirability (feasibility) of a possible action. These aspects of goal-
derived behavior are especially germane to the study of ethical behavior because in 
such contexts, people generally aspire to achieve a desirable end-state or higher-level 
goal (e.g., save money), but they may employ a feasible means of accomplishing this 
by engaging in unethical actions (e.g., lie about a competitor’s price to a merchant 
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who promises to match that competitor’s prices). As a result, when consumers adopt a 
higher construal level and thereby focus primarily on the desirability of the overall 
goal, they are likely to anticipate that more unethical behavior will occur and in real 
life situations behave more unethically.  However, when they adopt a low construal 
level and focus on means and their feasibility, the reverse is likely to occur. 
In my first three studies, I altered construal level using alternative priming 
manipulations that included altering different dimensions of psychological distance, 
namely temporal distance (study 1), perceptual fluency (study 2), and social distance 
(studies 1, 2 and 3). Psychological distance refers broadly to the subjective gap in 
dimensions such as time, space, or social closeness that separates an event or object 
from the direct, personally experienced reality of the self. In study 1, construal level 
was varied using a temporal distance manipulation where the target event was 
described as taking place in either the near or distant future. In study 2, it was 
manipulated metacognitively by presenting the ethics relevant scenarios in text that 
was either relatively easy or hard to read. The increased (decreased) perceptual 
fluency that the reader experienced when apprehending the message reduced 
(enhanced) his or her perceived psychological distance from the described event and 
thereby induced the reader to adopt a low (high) construal level. Finally, in study 3, 
construal level was varied via a construal level manipulation. In addition, studies 1, 2, 
and 3 all included a second construal level manipulation that altered social distance. 
This was accomplished by describing the focal actor in each scenario as either the 
participant him or herself or an unknown other person. I expected that the effect of 
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social distance as a construal level manipulation--that is, presenting the self as 
opposed to an unknown other person as the focal actor--would be especially powerful 
and induce a very low construal level. This follows because the self anchors the low 
construal level endpoint in any manipulation of psychological distance, making it an 
extremely potent means of inducing use of a low construal level. Hence, when the self 
was identified as the actor, I reasoned that the extremely low construal level it fosters 
may overpower the other more subtle or less direct construal level manipulations I 
introduced. The results from these first three studies supported such theorizing. They 
revealed that construing an event at a high versus low level increased participants’ 
expectations that an unknown other person would behave unethically. Yet, when the 
scenario involved the actions of the self, quite different outcomes emerged. When the 
self was identified as the actor, participants anticipated that they would behave in an 
ethical manner, and this outcome was maintained regardless of the other factor that 
altered their construal level (i.e., a temporal distance, perceptual fluency, or a 
construal level priming manipulation). 
 
The Mediating Effects of Desirability and Feasibility 
The outcomes observed in these three studies can be explained in terms of 
respondents’ construal level and the relative emphasis that such construal leads 
people to place on the desirability of end-states and the feasibility of means. Recall 
that when people engage in unethical behaviors, they generally do so because their 
behaviors allow them to achieve a desirable higher level end-state or goal, even 
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though the particular means used to make that end-state feasible are unethical. This 
suggests that when other people’s behavior is in question, increasing respondents’ 
sensitivity to feasibility (desirability) concerns by inducing a lower (higher) construal 
level will generally lead these individuals to anticipate that others’ behavior will be 
more ethical (unethical).  Yet, importantly, a different outcome should occur when 
respondents explicitly consider the self and their own behavior. Because direct 
attention to the self encourages adoption of a particularly potent and very low 
construal level, other factors that otherwise could alter construal level should be 
subjugated, prompting all respondents to claim that they themselves would behave 
ethically.  
My first two studies offered support for the outcomes that I predicted would 
occur on (un)ethical behavior, and I assumed they emerged because a higher (lower) 
construal level fostered a greater emphasis on desirability (feasibility) concerns. 
Importantly, however, study 3 sought evidence of the assumed relationships between 
construal level, concerns about desirability and feasibility, and (un)ethical behavior.  
Like the preceding studies, study 3 varied construal level in two ways. In addition to 
altering social distance by varying whether either an unknown individual or the self 
was the actor, construal level was also manipulated via a priming task that required 
participants to categorize a number of items at either a superordinate (high construal) 
or subordinate (low construal) level.  Following this task, participants read several 
scenarios in which either an unknown person or they themselves confronted ethical 
dilemmas. For each dilemma, they were asked to anticipate how the protagonist 
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would behave. Immediately after indicating their response, participants reported all 
thoughts that they had considered in arriving at their assessment. These thoughts were 
coded for whether they represented either a desirability or a feasibility related 
concern. Then, these two types of thoughts were analyzed as potential mediators of 
the observed interaction of the two construal level factors (i.e., the social distance 
factor and the construal level prime). 
Results of the analyses offered support for the view that both desirability and 
feasibility related cognitions play important roles in explaining the influence of 
construal level on (un)ethical behavior. An initial series of regressions revealed that 
desirability related thoughts mediated the overall effect of construal level on 
anticipated unethical behavior. Yet, beyond this, whether the self or an unknown 
person was the actor in each ethical dilemma moderated the mediating role played by 
desirability related cognitions. More specifically, while variation in construal level 
significantly influenced the number of desirability related thoughts that participants 
produced when they considered the behavior that an unknown other person would 
enact, this relationship was absent when participants anticipated how they themselves 
would behave. A second series of regressions then explored the role played by 
feasibility concerns by examining the mediating effect of both types of thoughts, 
namely the magnitude of feasibility related thoughts less desirability related thoughts. 
The results of this analysis were consistent with my reasoning that when participants 
considered how they themselves would behave to the ethical dilemmas, they would 
adopt a very low construal level, and this exceptionally low construal level would 
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greatly elevate the impact of feasibility related thoughts. Hence, when participants 
anticipated their own behavior to the ethical dilemmas, the increase in feasibility 
related thoughts that transpired dampened the influence of desirability related 
thoughts. As a result, the heightened feasibility related thoughts prompted participants 
to anticipate that they would behave ethically in response to the dilemma, and this 
was so irrespective of construal level prime.   
 
Investigating the Role of the Self: Self-Presentation and Salience of the Self 
The three studies I have discussed thus far found that when individuals were 
asked to anticipate how they themselves would respond to ethical dilemmas, they 
consistently maintained that they would behave ethically. Yet, this observation seems 
curious, given that much real world evidence suggests that people quite frequently 
engage in unethical actions. What might account for this seeming disparity? One 
possible explanation is that participants who were asked to anticipate their own 
behavior reported that they would behave quite ethically not because the self invoked 
a very low construal level as I predicted, but instead because consideration of the self 
stimulated their desire to present themselves favorably either to themselves or to other 
people. In other words, self presentation concerns might have produced the outcomes 
that were observed in the self as actor condition. I investigated this possibility in 
several of my studies and probed self presentation in assorted ways. However, 
analyses of these self presentation variables uncovered only one, impression 
management, that suggested it had a systematic effect on anticipated ethical behavior. 
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Yet importantly, neither this factor, nor any of the other measures of self-presentation 
ever reduced the significance of the interaction between the two instantiations of 
construal level (i.e., social distance and either temporal or metacognitive distance) 
that I observed in my studies. Thus, there seems to be weak, if any, support for the 
view that my findings can be explained by self presentation concerns.  
My final two studies, experiments 4 and 5, investigated a different and more 
promising explanation for the apparent discrepancy in the outcomes observed in my 
first three studies (i.e., studies that probed the self’s anticipated behavior to 
hypothetical ethical dilemmas) versus how people are known to often behave in real 
life dilemmas of this type. This explanation centers on the extent to which the 
responder (i.e., oneself) who encounters such dilemmas explicitly attends to the self 
as (s)he considers the ethical dilemmas. Recall that in my first three studies, 
participants responded to hypothetical ethical scenarios where they were asked how 
they (i.e., the self) would behave. Given the imaginary context of these studies, 
participants had to devote resources to mentally envision themself in each scenario in 
order to make predictions about their behavior. As a result, participants who were 
required to predict their own behavior devoted direct and explicit attention to the fact 
that the self was the actor (i.e., the protagonist) in the situation. Further, this explicit 
salience of the self in all likelihood induced an abnormal spotlight of attention on the 
self and similarly fostered the adoption of an abnormally strong low construal level. 
In turn, this abnormally low construal level substantially increased the magnitude of 
feasibility related thoughts that were generated and thus strongly reduced 
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expectations that the responders might behave unethically. However, note that in real 
life situations where ethics are at issue, individuals’ attention to the self is far weaker 
because such individuals must decide how they will respond in real time when their 
attention is diverted to highly relevant focal matters, such as the task they must 
perform, the stimuli they receive and must assess, their prevailing goals, and so on. 
Indeed, in these sorts of real life situations, individuals who must determine their 
behavior do not devote explicit, direct, or even high attention to the self because they 
are preoccupied with more germane matters involving the situation at hand. And 
because the salience of the self is much weaker in these real world situations, other 
factors that may exist and affect their construal level are likely to be more influential 
in affecting their cognitions and behavior than the salience of the self.  My final 
studies, experiments 4 and 5, were designed to assess this possibility.   
Both studies 4 and 5 confirmed my expectation that when individuals were 
confronted with a real (not merely an imaginary hypothetical) opportunity to behave 
dishonestly, those who employed a high versus low construal level responded in a 
fairly dishonest, self-serving manner. Particularly informative were the findings of 
study 5. This study demonstrated that when individuals’ explicit attention to the self 
was manipulated, it in fact moderated the impact of construal level on dishonest 
behavior. That is, this study replicated the results of study 4, showing that when 
participants’ attentiveness to the self was low, those who employed a high versus low 
construal level behaved more dishonestly.  But when participants engaged in explicit 
focus on the self prior to responding to a task that allowed for dishonest self serving 
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action, variation in their construal level had no effect on their level of dishonesty. 
Presumably for these individuals who attended explicitly to the self, construal level 
was significantly reduced, which elevated the relative importance of feasibility 
related concerns. Apparently the impact of this latter factor counteracted the influence 
that variation in construal level would otherwise exert on individuals’ (un)ethical 
behavior.   
 
4.2 CONTRIBUTIONS TO THEORY AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
Together, the results from all five studies make important contributions to 
both the study of ethical behavior and construal level theory. While researchers in 
marketing have already produced a sizable body of research on the topic of ethics 
(e.g., Nill and Schibrowsky [2007] listed over 400 articles on this subject in 
marketing journals alone), Randall et al., (1990) noted the “surprisingly limited effort 
directed toward theory testing” in this area.  By drawing on the established theory 
concerning construal level, my research makes progress in filling this gap. 
Specifically, it informs researchers and practitioners of the important role that 
construal level can have on individuals’ ethical decision-making. The findings clarify 
this role by demonstrating that alternative manipulations of construal level (i.e., 
temporal distance, social distance, perceptual fluency, and a construal level priming 
task) all exert similar effects, yet a social distance induction that draws explicit 
attention to the self can invoke the use of a particularly potent low construal level that 
can override the effects of other manipulations. The present research also makes a 
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contribution by illuminating the workings of the mechanism that operates and affects 
ethical decision-making (i.e., thoughts about desirability and feasibility aspects of the 
situation). Not only does this analysis enhance our understanding of the underlying 
process, but it adds to construal level theory itself by explicating a consequence that 
can occur when construal level is varied. 
Construal level theory has posited that variation in construal level can alter the 
emphasis people place on desirability versus feasibility related concerns (see Trope 
and Liberman 2003 and 2010 for reviews). However, extant evidence of this has 
consisted largely of outcome-based inferences. That is, researchers typically have 
established the relationship between construal level and a desirability or feasibility 
emphasis by identifying outcomes thought to signify high or low desirability or 
feasibility, pairing these outcomes into options, and then asking individuals which 
option they preferred in contexts where construal level was manipulated in various 
ways (e.g., temporally in Liberman et al., 1998 or probabilistically in Sagristano, 
Trope and Liberman 2002). To date, the strongest evidence of these different 
emphases has come from correlational data, which have shown a relationship between 
construal level and desirability or feasibility related attributes (Todorov et al., 2007). 
Hence, prior research has never actually documented the nature of the cognitions 
produced by people who employ alternative construal levels, nor has it demonstrated 
the proposed asymmetry in the emphases of such cognitions (i.e., people do not 
consider engaging in a behavior until the behavior first attains some threshold level of 
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desirability; once this threshold has been met, however feasibility related concerns 
become very important). 
In contrast, my research provides a far more rigorous investigation of the 
proposed linkage between construal level and people’s emphasis on desirability or 
feasibility related concerns. It does this by first demonstrating a reproducible 
interaction between two factors that vary construal level, where one is a critical social 
distance factor that alters and identifies the actor of interest as either an unknown 
other person or the self.  I then report a study that replicates this interaction, collects 
people’s thoughts about the situation, and codes these thoughts in terms of whether 
they concern desirability or feasibility matters.  I proceed by conducting formal tests 
of mediated moderation and full mediation. Tests of mediated moderation for 
desirability concerns provided initial evidence for the important roles played by both 
desirability related cognitions and the self. While variation in construal level 
significantly influenced the number of desirability related thoughts that participants 
produced when they considered the behavior that an unknown other person would 
enact, this effect was absent when participants anticipated how they themselves 
would behave; here the self was always anticipated to behave ethically. The role that 
feasibility concerns play in accounting for this moderating effect of low social 
distance (i.e., when the self is the actor) was investigated in a second set of 
regressions, which tested for full mediation. In these latter regressions, the relative 
magnitude of feasibility and desirability related thoughts was evaluated by creating an 
index where the number of desirability related thoughts was subtracted from the 
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number of feasibility related thoughts. Results here revealed that this latter index that 
captured the relative magnitude of feasibility related thoughts fully mediated the 
interaction effect of construal level and social distance. Follow-up analyses offered 
important insight into the role of both types of thoughts. Feasibility related thoughts 
were significantly greater when participants anticipated their own behavior, and 
particularly so when such participants employed a lower construal level. When 
participants anticipated the behavior of an unknown other, however, desirability 
related cognitions were more prominent, and this was particularly so when construal 
level was higher. 
These findings support an important assertion made by researchers of 
construal level theory (Todorov et. al. 2007). Although feasibility concerns are 
secondary to desirability matters, they play an important role when individuals 
employ a low construal level. Indeed, this was observed in my research. In particular, 
the results of my tests of mediation and mediated moderation showed that when 
individuals considered their own behavior, which prompts the use of a low construal 
level, they produced a substantial number of feasibility related thoughts that mitigated 
the impact of fairly subtly induced changes in construal level.  However, participants 
who assessed the behavior of an unknown other displayed higher levels of desirability 
(feasibility) related thoughts and lower levels of feasibility (desirability) related 
thoughts when they were prompted to think at a high (low) construal level. Further, 
full mediation was obtained only when the effects of both types of thoughts were 
tested simultaneously.  
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The results of my research are also noteworthy as they provide the first 
evidence for the unique role that explicit consideration of the self can play in strongly 
lowering one’s construal level. When participants considered their own behavior and 
did so in a way that prompted explicit attention to the self (i.e., in a hypothetical 
context), they elicited such high levels of feasibility related thoughts that other factors 
which typically alter construal level (i.e., variation in temporal distance, 
metacognitive distance, or a construal level prime) exerted no effect on predicted self 
behavior. Although researchers who study construal level theory have previously 
proposed that feasibility related thoughts can become very important in determining 
the choices and behaviors of individuals (Freitas et al., 2001; Sagristano et al., 2002), 
my research provides the clearest empirical evidence of this.  
My last two studies contribute to our understanding by examining whether 
consideration of the self will always exert an invariable and powerful lowering effect 
on construal level that essentially eliminates the impact of other factors that alter 
construal level. In these studies, I manipulated not only individuals’ construal level 
using a relatively subtle induction, but I also altered whether or not individuals 
devoted explicit attention to the self. Importantly, each of these manipulations was 
introduced just before these individuals received a real-life opportunity (i.e., no 
longer a hypothetical one) to behave dishonestly. The results are informative. They 
show that relatively subtle construal level manipulations can in fact influence 
people’s own real world behavior and do so in the manner I predicted earlier: 
adoption of a higher construal level will prompt less ethical (i.e., less honest) 
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behavior. However, whether this will occur depends on the extent to which 
individuals pay explicit attention to the self. When attention to the self is explicit 
(which is likely to ensue in hypothetical contexts that artificially render the self 
salient or if an external prime inflates the salience of the self), consideration of the 
self will powerfully lower construal level, overpower other weaker manipulations of 
construal level, and generally stimulate honest or ethical behavior. But when attention 
to or the salience of the self is weak, as is common in real world contexts where 
attention is diverted to far more pressing issues, other relatively subtle factors that 
alter construal level will affect how honestly (i.e., ethically) individuals behave. Here, 
as seen before when considering others’ behavior, adoption of a higher construal level 
will reduce one’s own honesty or ethical behavior.    
One reasonable question that might be asked is why prior Construal Level 
Theory (CLT) research has not found that making choices or judgments for the self 
prompted such a low construal level such that other changes in construal level (e.g., 
construal level primes, changes in temporal distance, etc.) were ineffective. At least 
two possible reasons come to mind.  
First, in previous construal level research, participants have not been asked to 
explicitly imagine or observe themselves making a choice or behaving in a particular 
manner. Instead, prior research has asked participants to evaluate a product (Trope 
and Liberman 2000) or a message (e.g., Chandran and Menon 2004) or choose a 
product (e.g., Borovi, Liberman and Trope 2010) without requiring that they 
explicitly envision the self as the decision maker.  In my research, however, attention 
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to the self was heightened (i.e., through a pronoun circling task, or by explicitly 
asking that participants envision themselves acting out the action).  Based on CLT, 
the dedicated and explicit attention that was devoted to the self in my research 
reduced psychological distance, magnifying low construal level thinking.  Note that 
this impact of explicitly considering the self prior to making a judgment is supported 
by research in social psychology. Specifically, the importance of the actor-observer 
distinction, which was first introduced by Jones and Nisbett (1972), has since 
generated a substantial body of evidence which shows that while actors focus more 
on the surrounding environment and situational factors, observers focus more on the 
actor performing a particular behavior (e.g., Hung and Mukhopadhyay 2012; Frank 
and Gilovich 1989; Jones and Nisbett 1972).  This research suggests that prior 
research in CLT which has asked participants to make a choice or a judgment 
solicited responses from participants as “actors,” which increased participants’ focus 
on situational factors relevant to the choice or judgment at hand.  In my research, 
however, by asking participants to envision (i.e., observe) themselves prior to making 
a judgment, the salience of the self was significantly heightened for participants by 
adopting the role of an observer. This increased focus on the self reduced 
psychological distance, such that additional changes in construal level were 
effectively mitigated. 
A second possible explanation pertains to the nature of the dependent 
variables in most of the prior research on construal level theory. Of the few 
experiments that presented participants with hypothetical situations, the choices that 
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individuals made were of little personal consequence (e.g., they evaluated skin-
lotions and hotels in Kim et al., 2008; a clock radio in Trope et al., 2000; an 
apartment in Borovoi, et al., 2010). Yet, in real life, many of the choices that 
consumers face have important personal consequences (i.e., where to go for vacation, 
which house to buy) -- and this is also often true for choices with ethical implications 
(e.g., how to acquire the funds to pay for tuition, which job candidate to hire). It 
seems possible that the extremity of the low construal level that is induced when a 
social distance manipulation references the self is contingent on how personally 
consequential the focal item is for the individual.  Recall that the gap that embodies 
psychological distance always takes as its point of reference the self’s personal reality 
of the here and now. As such, it follows that items or issues that are of greater 
personal consequence at that particular moment are especially likely to render a 
particularly low construal level. 
Unlike most construal level studies, the target issues in my research would 
seem to concern matters of immediate personal consequence to individuals if only 
because of their ethical implications. There is some evidence of this in my first study. 
In study 1, I found that participants who were more concerned with presenting a 
favorable image to others (i.e., impression management was high) predicted 
significantly less unethical behavior of themselves. While the inclusion of this 
impression management factor did not reduce the significance of the key interaction 
that I observed, this result seems to suggest that for at least some participants, the 
predictions they made about their own unethical behavior were of some consequence. 
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Finally, this effect of impression management raises the possibility that a combination 
of two factors may be needed to produce a major reduction in psychological distance 
such that construal level will be potently low: it may be that salience of the self needs 
to be heightened, and the issue at hand must also be one of considerable consequence 
(i.e., such as providing a prediction about their own unethical behavior). 
A related issue that merits additional research concerns a particular aspect of 
the interaction observed in study 5.  As I noted before, one outcome here did not fully 
align with my expectations. In my first three studies I found that the same level of 
unethical behavior was expected in three of the four conditions; only when 
participants made predictions about an unknown other while relying on a high 
construal level did they differ, (i.e., participants predicted significantly less ethical 
behavior in this condition). In study 5 however, when a low construal level was 
induced, participants for whom the self was not salient (i.e., those who completed the 
article circling task) behaved significantly more honestly than participants for whom 
the self was salient (i.e., those who completed the pronoun circling task). The logic I 
ultimately developed in this research is that the article circling task somewhat 
strengthened participants’ low construal level by requiring them to attend to low-level 
features of the stimulus (i.e., identifying the articles embedded in the short passage), 
subsequently reducing the level of dishonorable behavior that those participants 
engaged in by increasing the importance of feasibility related considerations. Future 
research should assess the viability of this post hoc explanation for the aberrant 
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outcome. This might be done by manipulating salience of the self in another manner - 
- one that would not require attention to low-levels features of a stimulus.     
The observation that construal level can impact and expand our understanding 
of how ethically people behave suggests that additional research may provide other 
insights into the relationship between construal level and ethical behavior.  For 
example, variation in construal level might impact how individuals’ evaluate their 
own moral character following a moral transgression, and perhaps this in turn could 
impact subsequent behavior. This proposition is based on research which has 
demonstrated that a low (high) construal level increases the relative number of 
feasibility (desirability) related thoughts. In addition, my research revealed that a 
relative increase (decrease) in feasibility related thoughts produces greater (reduced) 
awareness of the dishonest elements of an ethical dilemma, thereby reducing 
(increasing) the likelihood of unethical behavior. Together, these results suggest that 
the impact of observing oneself behaving unethically, or receiving feedback about 
how honestly someone has behaved, might differ systematically depending on one’s 
construal level. For example, by increasing the salience of the unethical aspect of an 
ethical dilemma, a lower-construal level might increase the extent to which a person 
feels dishonest or immoral upon receiving feedback indicating that he or she has 
behaved dishonestly. Importantly, this increased feeling of dishonesty could have 
predictable effects on subsequent behavior: the subsequent increase in feelings of 
dishonesty might result in corrective action on a subsequent task in which the 
individual confronts an opportunity to behave dishonestly. Although admittedly this 
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proposed causal chain remains speculative, it illustrates the potential ways in which 
construal level theory may enable us to better understand whether and when 
individuals will behave (un)ethically. 
A further example of the importance of Construal Level Theory (CLT) to 
understanding moral behavior has been provided by a recent set of results that appear 
to conflict with my own. In that research the authors have suggested that because 
values are abstract representations of ideal end states (e.g., Torelli and Kaikati 2009), 
a higher construal level, which increases the salience of values, should enhance moral 
behavior (Torelli et al., 2009; Eyal et al., 2009, Eyal et al., 2008). In this research, 
participants were presented with actions that were unequivocally immoral (e.g., 
eating one’s dog, incest, using ones national flag as a cleaning rag). The results 
revealed that a higher construal level increased both admonition of immoral behaviors 
and the expectation that participants would themselves behave in a more moral 
manner.  These results seem to be in direct opposition to my own findings, which 
suggest that because a higher construal level increases the importance of desirability 
related concerns, it should lead participants to predict less ethical behavior of others 
and actually behave less ethically themselves. 
Recently a framework has been introduced by Goodman and Malkoc (2012) 
that predicts these opposing results. In their research they suggest that CLT can make 
opposing predictions in certain circumstances and that these opposing predictions are 
based on two competing hypotheses. The first hypothesis, “the abstraction 
hypothesis,” predicts that a higher construal level causes people to alter how 
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information is represented as a result of attending to higher level, more abstract 
elements of a stimulus. According to this hypothesis, a higher construal level will 
cause participants to attend to values, a higher level construct, which should reduce 
immoral behavior. The second hypothesis, however, the “feasibility/desirability 
hypothesis” predicts that a higher construal level will cause participants to focus more 
on desirability considerations, and less on feasibility considerations, which will cause 
participants to behave less ethically. The authors suggest that the context of a decision 
or behavior can determine which of these two opposing hypotheses will more 
accurately predict an outcome. Specifically, Goodman and Malkoc suggest that when 
desirability/feasibility related elements of a behavior or choice are salient, the 
feasibility/desirability hypothesis will predict outcomes. Otherwise the abstraction 
hypothesis will provide more accurate predictions. 
This theorizing accounts for the apparent inconsistency between my own 
research and the existing research on CLT and moral behavior. While the prior 
research has revealed that a high construal level elicits more moral behavior, such 
work concerned behaviors that appear to be clearly morally wrong (e.g., eating one’s 
pet), which is likely to make the values associated with such immoral acts highly 
salient. My own research, however, presented more common everyday behaviors 
where judgments about how right or wrong a behavior is remains open to individuals’ 
idiosyncratic interpretation (e.g., providing confidential information to one’s 
employer). In other words, in the previous research participants were unlikely to 
automatically consider the trade-off between the desirability (e.g., the sustenance 
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provided by eating one’s pet) and the feasibility (e.g., killing and preparing the pet for 
consumption) elements of the behavior in question. Yet, in my research, I relied on 
ethical dilemmas, which, by definition elicit a trade-off between a beneficial outcome 
(i.e., desirability consideration) and a dishonorable behavior (i.e., feasibility 
consideration) (Murphy and Laczniak 2006).  It should be noted that this automatic 
consideration of desirability and feasibility elements is not unique to the domain of 
ethics.  Recently CLT has been used to study the dual role of prices as a signal of 
either quality (desirability) or sacrifice (feasibility), which supports that this trade-off 
can be elicited automatically as an integral part of the decision process (Yan and 
Sengupta 2011; Bornemann and Homburg 2011). 
 
4.3 MANAGERIAL CONTRIBUTIONS AND ADDITIONAL FUTURE 
RESEARCH 
My research shows that consumers who rely on higher level thinking expect 
others to behave less ethically. This has important implications for marketing 
practitioners. For example, prior research has found that bad behavior (e.g., a rude 
customer service agent) is evaluated less harshly when such behavior is expected 
(Solomon et al., 1985). Recall that my own research reveals that a high construal 
level can increase the level of unethical behavior that is expected of others.  Thus, 
prior research, together with the results of my work, suggest that corporations that are 
represented in memory at a higher, more abstract level may be criticized less harshly 
if they are involved in an ethical transgression because the higher construal level 
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elicited by the brand increases the expectation of ethical transgressions (e.g., thinking 
of Coca Cola as an internationally recognized icon versus as an Atlanta-based 
company that makes soda may exemplify company representation at a higher 
construal level; Aggarwal and Law 2005; Monga and Roedder John 2010). 
Consumers need to be aware of this relationship between construal level and 
expectations of unethical behavior. Otherwise organizations could take advantage of 
this relationship by, for example, using more abstract language to communicate with 
consumers following an ethical indiscretion. 
A second area in which my findings would seem to have interesting 
implications concerns negotiations. Recall that my research revealed that when 
individuals assessed the ethical behavior of others, a higher construal level 
significantly increased the expectation of unethical behavior. Now, consider a 
negotiations context where individuals can address the issues at hand in either a 
cooperative or adversarial manner. In this situation, the actor must consider 
simultaneously the actions that the self will take and those that another individual will 
take. A number of unanswered questions emerge here. Will the construal level of one 
person involved in the negotiations affect his or her perceptions of how ethically the 
other person is likely to behave? If so, will these expectations about the latter 
person’s behavior influence how willing the first person is to behave unethically? 
Suppose that person one involved in a negotiation is given relevant data that is 
expressed in terms of specific numbers (i.e., a low construal level) versus in either 
percentages or pie charts (i.e., presumably a higher construal level). Could the 
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presentation format of the data alter this person’s construal level and thereby modify 
his or her expectations about how the opposing person will behave? Might this 
expectation influence person one’s own behavior?  
Currently, I am exploring some of these questions by investigating how 
construal level induced changes in the anticipated unethical behavior of a rival 
competitor may affect individuals’ own willingness to behave unethically. For 
example, as part of an in-class activity during the final week of class, students in a 
sales management course first completed a task that elicited either relatively high or 
low level thinking. Next, they read about a situation in which they had to decide 
whether to behave unethically in order to secure a large sale from an important client. 
Importantly, however, either before or after the students made a prediction about their 
own behavior, they were asked to predict how likely it was that the rival competitor 
would behave unethically. I expect that this study will shed light on whether the 
impact of construal level on predictions about other people’s unethical behavior can 
influence an individual’s own willingness to behave unethically. 
While the preceding discussion illustrates some practical implications of my 
research for individuals in dyadic relationships (i.e., the interaction of two 
individuals), my research also has important implications for ethical behavior more 
generally. Specifically, my work reveals that an actor’s ethical judgments and 
behaviors vary systematically with changes in construal level. This is an important 
finding because prior research has revealed that construal level can be influenced by a 
number of factors that are common elements of the consumer’s or marketing 
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practitioner’s daily life. Indeed, a number of largely atheoretical findings reported in 
the extant literature on marketing ethics support the effect of some of these everyday 
factors on ethical behavior, which I suspect are at least partly the result of how these 
factors influence individuals’ construal levels. For example, studies by Chonko et al., 
(1985) and Delaney et al., (1992) found that individuals who held positions that were 
low  (versus high) in an organization’s hierarchy and therefore presumably oversaw 
relatively concrete, low construal level matters were more cognizant of ethical 
problems within the company. Another study by Schweitzer and Hsee (2002) found 
that individuals were less honest in a negotiation when they possessed relatively 
uncertain information. Note that degree of certainty alters the probabilistic dimension 
of psychological distance, and thus less certainty prompts the use of a higher 
construal level (Todorov et al., 2007).  Although these and other existing findings are 
open to alternative explanations, their consistency with my theorizing is striking. 
While many such factors (e.g., position within an organization’s hierarchy, 
and level of certainty of information in a negotiation) have previously been identified 
as having an influence on ethical behavior, it is important to note that virtually all of 
these factors are quite fixed; that is, they are not easily controlled by an external agent 
like a company or marketer (e.g., organization size, Ford et al., 1994; position within 
an organization, Delaney et al., 1992; Machiavellianism, Kelley, Ferrell and Skinner 
1990; gender, Betz et al., 1989). In contrast, my research contributes to the study of 
ethics by introducing a highly malleable factor (i.e., construal level) that influences 
ethical behavior. A great deal of research has established both alternative ways and 
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the ease with which construal level can be varied (for reviews see Trope and 
Liberman 2003 and 2010). As a result, my research suggests that ethical behavior can 
be influenced by changing, say, the temporal framing of the decisions that consumers 
or managers face (e.g., highlighting the present as opposed to future aspects of a 
choice should reduce unethical decisions; e.g., Chandran and Menon 2004), or the 
social distance that the decision-maker perceives (e.g., reducing (increasing) 
perceived differences (similarities) between the decisions maker and the other party; 
e.g., Liviatan, Trope and Liberman 2008). Similarly, more recent research has 
revealed that physical distance (e.g., Henderson 2010) and the language used in 
verbal and written communications also can influence construal level (e.g., Stephan, 
Liberman and Trope 2010).  
The preceding examples clearly illustrate the importance of construal level as 
it affects ethical behavior in the real world. For instance, consider the fact that high 
level managers are often encouraged to employ higher construal level thinking (i.e., 
to focus on more global or bigger picture considerations) when faced with difficult 
decisions (e.g., CNN, August 30, 2012). Presumably high construal level thinking is 
deemed appropriate for such managers because the decisions they must make 
simultaneously involve multiple actors, multiple issues, and multiple consequences. 
My research suggests that this advice to adopt a high construal level may have 
negative consequences for society when the decisions that must be made involve an 
ethical dilemma. This follows because managers who employ a higher construal level 
in their decision-making may be more influenced by the desirable aspects of the 
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situation (e.g., increasing sales or profits) than the feasibility related unethical actions 
that may constitute the means employed (e.g., using deceptive advertising). While 
numerous factors could have contributed to the recent increase in corporate ethical 
transgressions, my research highlights the potentially important role that high level 
thinking may have played.  
In recent years, marketers and researchers have become more cognizant of 
why investigating ethics is important and what particular gaps in our knowledge act 
as critical impediments to enhancing our understanding (Nill et al., 2007).  My 
research not only explores this important area of study, but it also makes crucial 
headway in tackling some troubling gaps in our knowledge. In particular, my research 
addresses the dearth of theory-driven inquiry in research that explores (un)ethical 
behavior. It does this by applying insights offered by construal level theory, and in the 
process it adds to construal level theory by documenting and embellishing our 
understanding of the asymmetric nature of desirability and feasibility related 
concerns. In addition, my work brings to light an important, malleable, and 
potentially controllable factor that can influence ethical behavior in real-world 
settings, namely construal level. By being mindful of its impact and the assorted 
variables that can be used to alter it, consumers and managers can attempt to regulate 
or manage their environments so as to increase ethical behavior.  My hope is that the 
research I report in this dissertation will provide managers and consumers with a 
practical tool that will encourage all players in consumption and business contexts to 
behave more ethically. 
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TABLE 1 
EXPERIMENT 1:  
JUDGMENTS OF ETHICALNESS FOR EACH BEHAVIOR 
 
 
Judgments of Behavior (1 = Fine, 9 = Wrong) 
Scenario Min. Max. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Headset Return 1 9 6.97 1.81 
TV Discount 1 9 5.43 2.47 
Extra Shirt 1 9 4.26 2.56 
Confidential Info 1 9 7.33 1.71 
Pollution 1 9 7.57 1.73 
Frequent Flier 1 9 5.37 2.46 
Taking Markers 1 9 4.14 2.27 
Forgot Lunch 1 9 6.38 2.00 
Friend’s Party 1 9 4.23 2.19 
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FIGURE 1 
EXPERIMENT 1: EFFECT OF SOCIAL AND TEMPORAL DISTANCE 
ON ANTICIPATED UNETHICAL BEHAVIOR 
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FIGURE 2 
EXPERIMENT 2: EFFECT OF SOCIAL DISTANCE AND PERCEPTUAL 
FLUENCY ON ANTICIPATED UNETHICAL BEHAVIOR 
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FIGURE 3 
EXPERIMENT 3: EFFECT OF SOCIAL DISTANCE AND CONSTRUAL 
LEVEL PRIME ON THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE NUMBERS OF 
FEASIBILITY AND DESIRABILITY RELATED THOUGHTS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
131 
 
FIGURE 4 
EXPERIMENT 4: SAMPLE STIMULUS USED IN PERCEPTUAL TASK 
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FIGURE 5 
EXPERIMENT 5: EFFECT OF CONSTRUAL LEVEL AND SALIENCE OF 
(ATTENTION TO) THE SELF ON DISHONEST BEHAVIOR 
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FIGURE 6 
EXPERIMENT 5: SPOTLIGHT ANALYSIS OF CONSCIENTIOUSNESS ON 
CONSTRUAL LEVEL AND SALIENCE OF (ATTENTION TO) THE SELF 
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APPENDIX A 
 
SCENARIOS USED IN STUDY 3 
 
Jeri has / You have a frequent flier ticket that is non-transferable. A friend has 
offered to buy the ticket from Jeri / you for cash.  Despite the fact that there is no 
question that the ticket is non-transferable, how likely is it that Jeri / you will sell the 
ticket? 
Some time ago Chris / you bought a headset for some new voice-recognition 
software, but it isn’t working.  Chris / You lost the receipt but has / have been told 
that it’s possible to get a refund without a receipt at a small nearby computer store, 
even though the headset wasn’t purchased there.  How likely is Chris / are you to 
return the product for a refund at the nearby computer store? 
 
Leslie / You intend(s) to purchase a television set. To get a better deal, Leslie / you 
could tell the salesperson that another retailer is selling the same TV at a much 
cheaper price. In such cases, the word is that the retailer always matches the lower 
price without ever checking.  How likely is it that Leslie / you will tell the salesperson 
that the same television is selling for a cheaper price at another store? 
 
After a meeting, JD’s / your new boss asked for some confidential information about 
JD’s / your previous employer.  What are the chances that JD / you will provide the 
boss with this information? 
 
At work, a high ranking manager asked Sam / you to leave a vent open that will 
release smoke pollution in the air late at night when no one can see it. What is the 
likelihood that Sam / you will comply with this request? 
 
Jessie has / You have an important school project that has yet to be completed, but 
the project requires using a special type of marker. Aware that the supply room at 
work has some of these markers, how likely is it that Jessie / you will go to the supply 
room and bring the markers home for this purpose?   
 
Dominique was / You were invited to a dinner party at a friend’s house. The friend 
mentioned that his brother, who is intolerable to be around, will be there. The 
brother’s presence will ensure that Dominique / you won’t enjoy the party.  However, 
Dominique’s your friend is very fond of his brother, which makes it extremely 
uncomfortable to tell your friend the truth. Two options seem possible: You could 
either tell the friend the truth about his brother or lie by claiming to be ill on the night 
of the party. How likely is it that Dominique / you will claim to be ill on the night of 
the party? 
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Shelby is / You are hungry but forgot to bring lunch to work. There are no restaurants, 
vending machines, or other means of getting something to eat in the area. A co-
worker has about a week’s worth of snacks in the fridge, but she always refuses to 
share and no doubt will say no if asked for food. So Shelby is / you are debating 
whether or not to simply take a snack and not tell anyone. How likely is Shelby / are 
you to take a snack from the co-worker’s stash?  
Jami / You discovered that the mailman delivered a package that contains an 
unordered sweater along with some other items that were ordered. The bill includes 
no charge for the extra item, which was added by mistake. Jami / You tried on the 
sweater and it was a perfect match—perfect in coloring, style, and fit! Jami / You 
could easily return the sweater since some other items didn’t work out and need to be 
returned anyway. Still the temptation to keep it is high. What is the likelihood that 
Jami / you will say nothing and keep the sweater? 
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APPENDIX B 
 
BALANCED INVENTORY OF DESIRABLE RESPONDING: 
SOCIAL DESIRABILITY SCALE ITEMS 
 
 
 
Using the scale below as a guide, write a number beside each statement to indicate 
how much you agree with it. 
 
1 ---------------2 -------------- 3 -------------- 4 -------------- 5 -------------- 6 -------------- 
7 
Not True                                           Somewhat True                                               Very 
True 
 
1. My first impressions of people usually turn out to be right 
2. *It would be hard for me to break any of my bad habits 
3. I don’t care to know what other people really think of me 
4. * I have not always been honest with myself 
5. I always know why I like things 
6. * When my emotions are aroused, it biases my thinking 
7. Once I’ve made up my mind, other people can seldom change my opinion 
8. * I am not a safe driver when I exceed the speed limit 
9. I am fully in control of my own fate 
10. * It’s hard for me to shut off a disturbing thought 
11. I never regret my decisions 
12. * I sometimes lose out on things because I can’t make up my mind soon 
enough 
13. The reason I vote is because my vote can make a difference 
14. * My parents were not always fair when they punished me 
15. I am a completely rationally person 
16. * I rarely appreciate criticism 
17. I am very confident of my judgments 
18. * I have sometimes doubted my ability as a lover 
19. It’s all right with me if some people happen to dislike me 
20. * I don’t’ always know the reasons why I do the things I do 
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APPENDIX C 
 
BALANCED INVENTORY OF DESIRABLE RESPONDING: 
IMPRESSION MANAGEMENT SCALE ITEMS 
 
 
 
Using the scale below as a guide, write a number beside each statement to indicate 
how much you agree with it. 
 
1 ---------------2 -------------- 3 -------------- 4 -------------- 5 -------------- 6 -------------- 
7 
Not True                                           Somewhat True                                               Very 
True 
 
 
1. * I sometimes tell lies if I have to 
2. I never cover up my mistakes 
3. * There have been occasions when I have taken advantage of someone 
4. I never swear 
5. * I sometimes try to get even rather than forgive and forget 
6. I always obey laws, even if I’m unlikely to get caught 
7. * I have said something bad about a friend behind his or her back 
8. When I hear people talking privately, I avoid listening 
9. * I have received too much change from a salesperson without telling him or 
her 
10. I always declare everything at customs 
11. * When I was young I sometimes stole things 
12. I have never dropped litter on the street 
13. * I sometimes drive faster than the speed limit 
14. I never read sexy books or magazines 
15. * I have done things that I don’t tell other people about 
16. I never take things that don’t’ belong to me 
17. * I have taken sick-leave from work or school even though I wasn’t really sick 
18. I have never damaged a library book or store merchandise without reporting it 
19. * I have some pretty awful habits 
20. I don’t gossip about other people’s business 
 
* Items keyed in the “False” (negative direction   
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APPENDIX D 
 
13-ITEM SELF-MONITORING SCALE 
 
 
This page contains a series of statements that people might use to describe 
themselves. Please read each statement and assess the degree to which it describes 
you. Then, using the scale below each item, select the description that best reflects 
your level of (dis)agreement with the assertion. 
 
Certainly 
always 
false 
Generally 
false 
Somewhat 
false, but 
with 
exceptions 
somewhat 
true, but with 
exceptions 
Generally 
true 
Certainly 
always 
true 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
      
 
1. In social situations, I have the ability to alter my behavior if I feel that something 
else is called for. 
2. I have the ability to control the way I come across to people, depending on the 
impression I wish to give them. 
3. When I feel that the image I am portraying isn't working, I can readily change it to 
something that does. 
4. *I have trouble changing my behavior to suit different people and different 
situations. 
5. I have found that I can adjust my behavior to meet the requirements of any 
situation I find myself in. 
6. *Even when it might be to my advantage, I have difficulty putting up a good 
front.  
7. Once I know what the situation calls for, it's easy for me to regulate my actions 
accordingly, Sensitivity to expressive behavior of others. 
8. I am often able to read people's true emotions correctly through their eyes. 
9. In conversations, I am sensitive to even the slightest change in the facial 
expression of the person I'm conversing with. 
10. My powers of intuition are quite good when it conies to understanding others' 
emotions and motives. 
11. I can usually tell when others consider a joke to be in bad taste, even though they 
may laugh convincingly. 
12. I can usually tell when I've said something inappropriate by reading it in the 
listener's eyes. 
13. If someone is lying to me, I usually know it at once from that person's manner of 
expression. 
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APPENDIX E 
 
SOCIAL INTEREST SCALE  
 
 
Below are a number of pairs of personal characteristics or traits. For each pair, 
underline the trait which you value more highly. In making each choice, ask yourself 
which of the traits in that pair you would rather possess as one of your own 
characteristics. For example, the first pair is “imaginative – rational.” If you had to 
make a choice, which would you rather be? Select your choice in each pair. 
Some of the traits will appear twice, but always in combination with a different trait. 
No pairs will be repeated. 
 
I would rather be… 
imaginative – rational 
helpful – quick witted 
neat – sympathetic 
level-headed – efficient 
intelligent – considerate 
self-reliant – ambitious 
respectful – original 
creative – sensible 
generous – individualistic 
responsible – original 
capable – tolerant 
trustworthy – wise 
neat – logical 
forgiving – gentle 
efficient – respectful 
practical – self-confident 
capable – independent 
alert – cooperative 
imaginative – helpful 
realistic – moral 
considerate – wise 
sympathetic – individualistic 
ambitious – patient 
reasonable – quick-witted 
 
Keyed items are underlined. The social interest score consists of the number of 
underlined characteristics chosen by the individual. 
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APPENDIX F 
 
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS SCALE  
 
 
Private self-consciousness sub-scale 
 I'm always trying to figure myself out 
*Generally, I'm not very aware of myself 
I reflect about myself a lot 
I'm often the subject of my own fantasies 
*I never scrutinize myself 
I’m generally attentive to my inner feelings 
I'm constantly examining my motives 
I sometimes have the feeling that I'm off somewhere watching myself 
I'm alert to changes in my mood 
I’m aware of the way my mind works when I work through a problem 
 
Public self-consciousness sub-scale 
I'm concerned about my style of doing things 
I'm concerned about the way I present myself 
I'm self-conscious about the way I look 
I usually worry about making a good impression 
One of the last things I do before I leave my house is look in the mirror 
I’m concerned about what other people think of me 
I’m usually aware of my appearance 
 
* item was reversed for scoring. 
Each item is rated on a scale of 0 (extremely uncharacteristic) to 4 (extremely 
characteristic). 
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APPENDIX G 
 
SCENARIOS USED IN STUDY 3 
 
 
 
After a meeting, JD new boss asked for some confidential information about JD’s 
previous employer.  What are the chances that JD will provide the boss with this 
information? 
 
 
At work, a high ranking manager asked Sam to leave a vent open that will release 
smoke pollution in the air late at night when no one can see it. What is the likelihood 
that Sam will comply with this request? 
 
Jessie has an important school project that has yet to be completed, but the project 
requires using a special type of marker. Aware that the supply room at work has some 
of these markers, how likely is it that Jessie will go to the supply room and bring the 
markers home for this purpose?   
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APPENDIX H 
 
STUDY 3: OPEN RESPONSE INSTRUCTIONS 
 
 
 
We are also interested in all the thoughts that went through your mind as you 
considered the preceding question about JD’s response to the boss’s request.  In the 
space below, please write down every thought, consideration, feeling, idea, or opinion 
that went through your mind as you considered how likely it is that JD would provide 
the requested information.  Note that it is important that you try to be as complete as 
possible in recording your thoughts, even though they may have passed through your 
mind only momentarily. Of course at the same time, be sure you do not record new 
thoughts that may occur to you now but that you did not truly think of at the time you 
rendered your response. 
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APPENDIX I 
 
STUDY 5: PRONOUN/ARTICLE TASK 
 
 
 
High Salience of the Self Condition: Pronoun Task 
 
A PRONOUN is a word that replaces a noun in a sentence. Examples include words 
like "he," "she,” and “I,” which make sentences less cumbersome or repetitive.  
Pronouns can be singular (e.g., he, me, I), possessive (e.g., his, my, mine) or plural 
(e.g., our, their, them).  As you read the following paragraph, please circle all of the 
PRONOUNS that you find in the paragraph.  Please be as thorough as possible. 
  
 
Paragraph 1 
 
I often go to the city by myself.  It surprises me how my mind fully engages once I 
see the skyscrapers come into view. I peer around street corners, myself breathing in 
the gritty odors around me. My ears hear faint music filling the air and street. Yet, I 
miss no sight. I roam crowded markets, and I see myself look at me as I glare at glass 
buildings. As night falls, I browse chatty sidewalk vendors, my hand touches the 
wares. When finally I must leave, I check my calendar to set a date when I can return. 
The city belongs to me. 
 
 
Paragraph 2 
 
I feel my well-being surge as I mount my bicycle. Me, a veteran biker of parkways, 
back roads, and trails. I begin by slipping into a tunnel that guides my journey. Soon I 
speed out the distant opening that gradually enlarges into brilliant sunlight. It causes 
me to squint and makes my mind come alive. Soon I see myself coming upon a 
skater. The voice shouting, “passing on left” is mine. I turn and catch the skater 
looking at me, trying to match my speed. Whizzing by are familiar sights embossed in 
my memory. I glimpse my mottled shadow mimicking my every move in a nearby 
stream. A pothole catches me by surprise, and I feel myself wobble. But, nothing 
fazes me. I quickly regain my balance, reestablish my rhythm, and pick up the 
daydream I was enjoying right where I left off.    
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Control Condition:  Article Task 
 
An ARTICLE is a part of speech that introduces or identifies a noun. Examples 
include the words “a,” “an,” and “the.” As you read the following paragraph, please 
circle all of the ARTICLES (the words: a, an, the) that you find in the paragraph. 
Please be as thorough as possible. 
 
 
Paragraph 1 
 
A decade ago, people resisted separating the glasses, the cans, and the paper out of 
garbage. What a hassle. Today we know that the world's resources are limited. It's 
time to bring the same consciousness to a growing medical crisis: the loss of 
antibiotic effectiveness against common bacterial illnesses. A person catches a cold 
that turns into a sinus infection. The doctor treats him with antibiotics, but the 
bacteria are resistant to all of them. The infection enters the person’s bloodstream– a 
condition known as septicemia. Or a person can have a bacterial disease, like an ear 
or a prostate infection. The antibiotics crisis is real. 
 
 
Paragraph 1 
Gardening is a creative and an engaging activity. It absorbs the gardener just as painting 
absorbs a painter. However, it also offers an assortment of added benefits. It can spur the 
imagination, keep a body fit, and enliven the mind. Even a child gains stimulation and 
pleasure from the color, shape, and the smell of a well tended garden. A garden is the 
home of many a species of butterflies, which lend charm to the atmosphere of the area. 
Birds too may grace a garden, making it a rainbow of colors or an oasis of relaxation. The 
melodic songs of a family of birds captivate passers-by, offering them an inviting escape 
from daily concerns. The garden lover tends to every plant as a child. A gardener fertilizes 
and waters the growing sprouts, always protecting them from a hot sun or an intruding 
animal.  
 
